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ABSTRACT
This study reviews broadly the experience of the last decade on crisis prevention and management.
It seeks to draw greater attention to policy decisions that are made during the phase when capital
inflows come to a sudden stop. Procrastination---the period of financing a balance of payments
deficit rather than adjusting---had serious consequences in some cases. Crises are more frequent and
more severe when short-term borrowing and dollar denomination external debt are high, and foreign
direct investment (FDI) and reserves are low, in large part because balance sheets are then very
sensitive to increases in exchange rates and short-term interest rates. If countries that are faced with
a fall in inflows adjusted more promptly, rather than stalling for time by running down reserves or
shifting to loans that are shorter-termed and dollar-denominated, they might be able to adjust on
more attractive terms.
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In the last 30 years, emerging markets have experienced at least two complete boom-bust 
cycles.  The last cycle was marked by rapid capital inflows from 1990 to 1996, followed by 
severe crises for some countries and scarce capital for all from 1997 to 2003.  This cycle bore 
similarities to the preceding 14 years, as well: large loans to developing countries from 1975 to 
1981, followed by the international debt crisis of 1982--89. Despite this volatility, many 
developing countries---although certainly not all---have ended this 30-year period with a far 
higher level of per capita income than they began it. 
 
Taking Stock of Recent History  
 
It is a good time to take stock of what has been learned from recent experience about the 
determinants of economic performance in emerging market countries. Which policies seem to 
work and which do not?  Scholarly research has not neglected the topic.   Indeed, it is striking 
how much emphasis has shifted within the field of international macroeconomics to the problems 
of developing countries.   But most of the contributions to the subject focus on one particular 
model, or one particular empirical effect.    While there are overviews of the late-1990s crises, 
there are not many that attempt to summarize and integrate what we have learned from the 
numbers.  It would help if the lists of variables that are run through statistical predictors of crisis 
probabilities were more visibly tied to the various competing theoretical models of crises. 
 
One lesson we are learning from the trend of recent research is that policymakers making 
decisions in real time are far more constrained in their options than we have pretended to believe.   
(The international financial institutions are of course one step further removed from the policy 
levers than the national authorities.)     Committing to a non-inflationary monetary policy with 
100 percent credibility may simply not be an option in light of past history and current political 
structures, no matter how sincere the governor of the central bank.   This is the case even in a pro-
reform political environment, such as prevailed in many countries in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, and even if an institutional commitment such as a currency board does happen to be an 
option politically.   These policies can always be reversed later, as history has shown.    Similarly, 
a decision to remove capital controls may not put a developing country in the same category of 
financial integration as an OECD country, because of the risk that capital controls will be re-
imposed in the future.   Moreover, measures of the composition of capital inflows, such as the 
maturity structure or the share of foreign-denominated debt, may not be amenable to policy 
choice in any given year.    Accordingly, the fourth section of this chapter will take a longer-run 
perspective.   The data set will be constructed from country-averages over the period 1990--2002.  
The analysis focuses on whether countries that on average had a particular degree of exchange 
rate flexibility or financial openness over this period tended on average to have a high or low 
level of volatility over the period.    
 
The study begins with a whirlwind summary of academic literature, emphasizing what is 
recent and what seems capable of producing a bottom line.    Included are the theoretical models 
of speculative attacks, which come in three “generations.”    In addition, each of the major policy 
questions that a country must decide has produced its own body of literature: the choice of 
exchange rate regime; the choice of capital account regime; openness to trade; institutional issues 
such as the quality of financial regulation; the composition of capital inflows; and the 
management of “sudden stop” events once they occur.
1    Included in the empirical section of the 
literature review are studies of leading indicators or crisis warning signals, which seek to include 
many factors, but which are not designed specifically to look at a variety of policy variables. 
Given all the theories and claims that have been offered, this study seeks to ask what 
combinations of policy variables seem empirically to be the most important, and which policy 
choices seem to work.   3 
 
   Methodologies 
 
The study tries out a number of different methodologies to discern determinants of 
economic performance.  An impressionistic consideration of the most visible crises of the 1994--
2002 period (Mexico, Thailand, Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Russia, Brazil, Turkey, and 
Argentina) concludes that there are more variables and hypotheses that need to be evaluated than 
there are major-crisis data points.   More systematic analysis requires turning to a larger set of 
developing countries.   The study approaches this larger data set several ways.     
 
First, a simple probit analysis looks to see which of the variables that are suggested by 
the literature are capable of helping forecast the increased likelihood of a currency crisis on an 
annual basis.  Second, the technique of regression tree analysis allows the data to choose freely 
which variables seem to matter the most.   The technique has been used in macroeconomics much 
less often than factor analysis.   But it has the advantage that it does not impose a linear functional 
form on the relationship.   It is a flexible way to look for robust statistical relationships including 
threshold and interactive effects.  This will be particularly important when we consider some of 
the hypotheses that are on the research frontier.   This includes the proposition that capital 
account liberalization is not helpful for all countries, but is helpful for those that have strong 
macroeconomic fundamentals, or those that have strong structural fundamentals, or those that 
have attained a threshold stage of financial or economic development.   The study uses regression 
analysis on a broad sample of countries from the 1970s to the present to offer direction as to 
which directions our econometric energies may be best spent. 
 
Third, the study applies conventional regression analysis to a cross-section of countries to 
explain performance during the most recent decade (taken to be 1990--2002, which includes both 
the boom and bust phase).    Fourth, the analysis focuses on the timing of currency crises---in 
particular, looking at a typical month-by-month profile for reserves preceding crises---again to 
see which crisis management policies seem to help and which do not. 
 
We use as our main criteria of economic performance the probability of having currency 
crises and the total output lost during crises.    The crisis prevention policies that we examine 
include: macroeconomic discipline (as measured by inflation, debt, budget deficits, money 
creation); institutional quality (corruption); financial integration (freedom from capital controls); 
currency regime (hard pegs, intermediate, and floating); openness (trade/GDP ratio); composition 
of inflows (maturity, share of FDI, currency mismatch) and reserves.   The crisis management 
policies that we examine include: promptness versus delay of adjustment (measured either as the 
length of the lag after reserves peak, or the amount of reserve loss during this period); changes in 
composition (again, maturity and currency); and the mix of policies during the adjustment period 
(expenditure reduction versus devaluation). 
 
Measures of Performance 
 
Before going further, it is important to be explicit about the objective function.   What is 
meant by “economic performance”?    The econometrics undertaken for this study included 
among the performance measures growth in real income over the sample period, or real income 
per capita, as in the standard growth literature.  However, the chapter places more emphasis on 
economic volatility than on the average growth rate.   The second measure of performance 
examined was the standard deviation of real growth.     The third measure was the number of 
financial crises, where each crisis is defined as a sharp drop in reserves or in the foreign exchange 
value of the currency (with the choice between the two presumed to be a matter of crisis   4 
management, rather than of the magnitude of the sudden stop of international investment).  The 
fourth measure was the average severity of the crises that do occur, measured by the depth of the 
output loss.    The fifth measure was the cumulation of output lost in financial crises. This is a 
direct aggregation of measures 3 and 4, but is also intended to be correlated with measures 1 and 
2.    While this fifth composite measure, called “crisis loss,” has no precise economic 
interpretation–the study does not attempt to guess what potential output might be during the 
crisis, for example–it is intended to be a good single heuristic to capture overall economic 
performance in a study on volatility.   This composite measure is the one that is emphasized in the 
reported results.  
 
In firmly grounded theoretical models, the key variable to use in evaluating economic 
performance is not real income, but consumption.  In theory, fluctuations in income (for example, 
as a result of exogenous fluctuations in the terms of trade) are not damaging for a small country 
integrated into world financial markets, because the country can sustain a smooth path for 
consumption by borrowing and lending.   Indeed, this is one of several important arguments in 
favor of open capital markets.  The study does not look at consumption data, for three reasons.    
First, during any given sample period, even one as long as several decades, consumption could 
grow unusually rapidly (as in Mexico in the early 1990s) or unusually slowly (as in Romania in 
the 1980s) because of expansionary or contractionary expenditure policies that will have to be 
reversed in the future.   A country with a spending boom that ends the sample period with 
correspondingly high levels of debt and inflation need not count as high-performing.   GDP is less 
vulnerable to this problem.    
 
Second, there is by now a rough consensus that international financial markets do not in 
fact work in the perfect textbook fashion. International investors are not willing to lend more to 
countries undergoing recession to smooth consumption; if anything, the reverse is true.   Third, as 
imperfect as are the data on GDP and the other variables in the analysis, the data on consumption 
are worse.    For all three reasons, the study uses GDP to calculate the measures of economic 
performance: average growth, variability, and output lost to crises. 
 
Literature Review and Hypotheses to Be Tested 
 
Theories of Speculative Attacks 
 
  Economists’ theories of speculative attacks have organized themselves into three 
“generations.”   Each generation of models was launched by a seminal article or articles, of which 
a key feature was an attempt to answer the timing question, “What determines precisely when 
crises occur?”  Each relied on the assumption that speculators think ahead, and form their 
expectations rationally. Before considering the question of timing, it may be useful to explain the 
distinction among the three categories in terms of their attempts to answer the less technical and 
more inflammatory question of why they occur: Whose fault is the crisis? The first generation 
says domestic macroeconomic policy, the second generation says volatile financial markets, and 
the third generation says financial structure.  In neutral language, the explanations are, 
respectively, excessive macroeconomic expansion, “multiple equilibria,” and moral hazard.   In 
finger-pointing language, the respective culprits are undisciplined domestic policymakers, crazy 
international investors, and crony capitalists.
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First generation: Overly expansionary macroeconomic policy. The first generation of 
speculative attack models attributes balance of payments crises ultimately to overly expansionary 
macroeconomic policies. Most textbook analysis falls into this category.   Budget deficits must be 
financed by borrowing or monetary expansion.   Either way, the result is a current account deficit.    5 
If nothing is done to adjust in the face of what has become an overvalued currency, eventually the 
country will run out of reserves. Macroeconomic overexpansion and overvaluation were the 
standard diagnoses of balance of payments crises in developing countries before 1995, and were 
the basis of most adjustment programs administered by the International Monetary Fund.  The 
international debt crisis of the 1980s is an important example.
3 
 
What determines the timing of the attack?     This was the insight of the seminal article in 
the first generation approach by Paul Krugman (1979), the more intuitively accessible version of 
the model produced by Robert Flood and Peter Garber (1984), and the progenitor written by 
Stephen Salant and Dale Henderson (1978).    
 
Consider a country in which the balance of payments deficit is a steady $1 billion a year, 
because of ongoing monetary and fiscal expansion.   If the country has reserves of $5 billion, then 
apparently it can hold out for five years.  Absent some change, it will run out of reserves at the 
end of that time and will be forced to devalue or depreciate, by enough to eliminate the deficit.  
Krugman’s contribution was to identify the time at which the attack will come, in a country that 
will eventually run out of reserves. It will be sooner than five years.   If speculators are rational, 
they will not wait until then.  To do so would mean holding an asset–domestic currency–while 
knowing that it will suffer a discrete loss in value in the immediate future.    Any self-respecting 
speculator would instead shift his or her money out of the country at an earlier date.  When 
speculators all do this, they move the date of the crisis forward.  
 
One might then try to take this logic to the other limit, reasoning that the attack must take 
place much earlier: at the moment when the pattern of overexpansion and eventual devaluation 
first become clear.  But this also is not the right solution.   As long as the central bank has plenty 
of reserves to defend the exchange rate, speculators will be happy to wait.   There is an 
intermediate date, when the remaining stock of reserves has been run down to just the right level: 
still high enough that the speculators can get their money out, but no higher than that.  That is the 
date when the attack occurs.  The remainder of the reserves is then suddenly depleted in a single 
day.  This theory helps explain why the level of reserves is statistically a useful predictor---a low 
level of reserves signaling danger of crisis.   More precisely, the most useful prediction is that, 
under the particular assumptions of the Krugman-Flood-Garber model, the speculative attack will 
occur when the level of reserves has fallen to a level equal to the semi-elasticity of money 
demand times the post-crisis rate of inflation.  The latter variable is determined by the rate of 
expansion of domestic credit (assumed the same either pre-crisis or post-crisis). 
 
There have been many extensions and elaborations of the approach.  The original 
Krugman model emphasized certainty and assumed that the authorities would defend the parity 
until reserves declined to zero, giving the unrealistic implication that everyone could predict the 




Second generation: Multiple equilibria. The second generation of models argues that 
there is more than one possible outcome–crisis and no-crisis–that can be consistent with 
equilibrium, even if there has been no change in true fundamentals.
5   The multiple equilibrium 
approach originally took its inspiration from the crises in the European Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (ERM) of 1992--93.  
 
There had always been some who claimed that financial markets were excessively 
volatile, alternating between waves of optimism and pessimism. But the usual view among 
academic economists, as well as the international financial establishment, had been that markets   6 
are based on economic fundamentals, and that declining market prices or flows are merely the 
messenger or symptom of underlying problems.  This view became harder to maintain as a 
sequence of European currencies succumbed to attack.   The attack on France in 1993 was 
particularly puzzling, because the government had over the preceding years succeeded in 
attaining a level of macroeconomic discipline that by most indicators looked at least as great as 
that of Germany, its partner in the ERM.  Moreover, after the bands were widened, the crisis 
passed without a substantial further depreciation of the franc, even though there had been no 
tightening of macroeconomic policy in the meantime.  How then could the fundamentals have 
been responsible for the earlier speculative pressure?  Also puzzling were the cases of Sweden 
and the United Kingdom.  Both had shown a willingness to raise interest rates to extremely high 
levels to defend the krona and the pound in 1992. Yet speculators were unimpressed, and 
nonetheless persisted in attacks against those currencies.  Such a response, known as the interest 
rate defense, could apparently no longer be relied upon to work. 
 
The second generation point is most easily understood as a game played among 
speculators, along the lines of the classic “prisoners’ dilemma.”   Consider two speculators.   
Each realizes that if the other sells, the resulting depreciation will reduce the value of his holdings 
of domestic currency.    Neither wants to stand pat if the other might sell.  Thus the prisoners 
dilemma equilibrium might entail both selling, even though everyone may be worse off after the 
devaluation.    
 
Can one say anything about what conditions will make a country vulnerable to such an 
attack?   If the fundamentals are particularly weak, both speculators will sell.  If the central bank 
holds a sufficiently low level of reserves, then each speculator knows that if he chooses to sell his 
domestic currency, he will deplete the central banks’ holdings of foreign reserves, and thereby 
force a devaluation.  Each knows this, and so will sell to avoid being the one left “holding the 
bag.”  If the fundamentals are particularly strong, there will be no attack.  For example, if the 
level of reserves is sufficiently high that both speculators know they cannot break the bank even 
acting together, they have no reason to attack. The interesting case comes in the intermediate 
range.  If the fundamentals are bad but not terrible, then the country is vulnerable to an attack.  
But the game theory cannot predict what the outcome will be in this case.  The attack and no-
attack outcomes are equally valid equilibria.  This is what is meant by multiple equilibria. 
 
One variant is an international version of a standard model of domestic bank runs.  Each 
bank depositor is motivated to take his money out of the bank only if he thinks others might do 
the same, so that there might not be enough cash to go around.  The recommended solution is 
deposit insurance and adequate reserve holdings by the banks.
6    
 
Another variant treats monetary policy as endogenous.  After all, why should 
governments decide to embark on a dangerous path of excessive money growth that they 
stubbornly maintain regardless of adverse developments, as the first generation models assumed?  
The ultimate fundamentals are not macroeconomic policies, but rather the political conditions that 
might make the benefits of devaluation and monetary expansion more likely to outweigh the 
costs, from the viewpoint of the monetary authorities.  Some models suggest that a key 
fundamental variable, determining whether a country is in the intermediate range where 
speculative attacks are a danger, is the level of unemployment; some say it is the level of debt.
7  If 
these indicators are at particularly high levels, then the tight monetary policy necessary to fight a 
speculative attack will involve particularly high costs relative to benefits.  This is because the 
high interest rates may spark banking failures or social unrest.  Speculators know that the high 
interest rates are not politically sustainable, which makes an attack more likely even if the 
policymakers sincerely do their best to hold the line.     7 
 
Third generation: “Crony capitalism” and moral hazard. If crises of the 1970s and 
1980s are represented by the first generation approach, and if the 1992--93 ERM crises inspired 
the second generation models, then the East Asian crises of 1997--98 motivated the third 
generation models.  
 
Unlike Latin America and other parts of the world with a history of large budget deficits, 
high inflation monetary policies, and overvalued currencies, East Asia in the latter third of the 
20
th century earned a relatively good reputation for fiscal discipline and monetary stability.   This 
record was largely maintained right up until the crisis.   True, Thailand and Korea clung to 
overvalued currencies in the sense that they depleted their net reserves in futile attempts to defend 
the exchange rate, before trying something else.   But there had been limited evidence of 
profligate monetary and fiscal policy on the part of these governments, or of currencies that were 
overvalued in real terms.  Indeed, westerners had argued earlier that such high-growth countries 
are likely to experience real appreciations, reasoning according to the Balassa-Samuelson effect.  
 
In light of the judgment that most of these countries had relatively good macroeconomic 
policies, diagnoses have placed new emphasis on a different sort of fundamentals: structural 
distortions in the financial structures of emerging economies.   “Crony capitalism,” defined more 
formally as implicit government guarantees for poorly regulated banks and corporate debtors, has 
been the inspiration behind a “third generation” approach to currency crises.
8    (For some, the 
phrase “third generation” refers to the problems of balance sheet mismatch, particularly among 
banks.    The two sets of issues are closely related.) 
 
The third generation models interpret recent crises as illustrations of the perils of moral 
hazard.   Borrowers and lenders are less likely to be careful evaluating the true profitability of 
investment opportunities if they believe they will be bailed out in the event that the project goes 
badly.    
 
Some believe that international bailouts by the IMF and G-7 create the moral hazard 
problem.  But in the third generation models, the root-cause of moral hazard is at the national 
level rather than the international level.  If moral hazard at the international level were the 
original and only root of the problem, then it would follow that the amount of capital flowing 
from rich to poor countries overall would be greater than socially optimal. But instead, the 
amount of capital flowing, on average, is less than predicted by neoclassical economic models.  In 
other words, the large existing differences across countries in capital/labor ratios and therefore in 
the rate of return to capital predict that capital flow are likely to be larger than what is observed, 
not smaller. 
 
The phrase “crony capitalism” suddenly became popular in 1997, to describe newly 
evident flaws in the structure of Asian financial systems.   In fairness, some of these same 
characteristics had been seen as strengths of Asian economies a short time earlier.  Business deals 
are said to be dominated by personal connections (guan xi, in China), large family-run 
conglomerates (chaebol, in Korea), comprehensive clusters of allied firms (keiretsu, in Japan), or 
insider links to the government (charges of corruption, collusion and nepotism in Indonesia,  
regarding President Suharto). Firms may fund investments by borrowing from bankers with 
whom they have close personal or political ties.  The loans may come from a bank to which the 
firm is affiliated, in which case they are called connected lending, or may come under guidance 
from the government, in which case they are called directed lending.  In some countries, 
corruption pervades the system.   
   8 
An idealized version of American capitalism is held up as a contrasting example (or was, 
until the Enron scandals): transactions among corporations are said to be made at arms length, 
based on explicit contracts enforced under a transparent legal system.  Corporations rely heavily 
on securities markets to fund investment, where rules require accounting by recognized standards, 
and public disclosure of information.  The Asian system is termed “relationship-based,” and the 
American system, “market-based.” 
 
The insurance model of Michael Dooley (1997, 2000) starts from the assumption that 
government officials have a pot of resources that can be used to bail out political cronies if they 
get into financial difficulty. This pot is mainly identified with the central banks’ holdings of 
foreign exchange reserves, but it could also include whatever sources of hard currency the 
government can lay its hands on in the event of a crisis, whether funds that the country can 
borrow from the IMF, the government’s claim on revenue from export taxes, or any profitable 
state-owned enterprises or other holdings that the government could sell off.  Well-connected 
banks and businessmen are able to borrow from abroad to finance risky projects, such as real 
estate development or a new factory in the already-glutted steel industry.   They are aware of the 
risk.  But they believe that they will be bailed out by the government if things go badly.  In the 
worst countries, they have been explicitly promised that they will be bailed out.  In other cases, 
the government may have tried to declare in advance that it will not be responsible for private 
debts, but this disclaimer is not believed.
9 
 
Asian countries did not suddenly develop critical structural flaws in their financial 
systems for the first time in 1997. Why does the crisis occur when it does?   The timing of the 
attack again comes out of the calculations of speculators who worry that if they wait too long, 
there will not be enough foreign exchange reserves to go around.   But there is a key difference 
from the first generation models, which watched reserves decline steadily over time, and 
identified the timing of the attack as the point at which reserves sank to a particular critical level.   
The third generation models watch liabilities rise steadily over time, artificially encouraged by 
moral hazard.  They identify the timing of the attack with the point at which the liabilities have 
climbed to the critical level given by the level of reserves.  At that point, speculators suddenly 
cash in their investments.  If they wait any longer, they might not be able to get their money out.  
The speculative attack, as usual, then forces the central bank to abandon the exchange rate. 
 
Empirical implications of speculative attack models. Much of the theoretical literature 
on speculative attacks does not lead directly to empirical predictions.    There exists a small 
empirical literature.
10   It is for the most part not designed to distinguish among the competing 
models of speculative attack.   
 
One testable implication is the importance of the level of reserves, which features 
prominently in all three generations of models.    The first generation models suggest looking at 
the level of reserves relative to macroeconomic fundamentals such as the inflation rate and the 
rate of growth of domestic credit, or the budget deficit viewed as a key determinant of the rate of 
growth of domestic credit.   The second generation agrees that reserves are important; but if there 
are other empirical measures that matter, they are more likely to concern unemployment, 
elections, and other political variables.   The role of reserves in the third generation is less 
clearcut.  The Dooley version says, surprisingly, that a high level of reserves actually makes a 
speculative attack more likely---because there is a bigger pot of money to be exploited through 
shady connections---conditioned on the other variable the model considers to be most important: 
corruption.   Important counterexamples to this prediction would seem to be the success of China 
and Taiwan, Province of China, each with very high levels of reserves, in weathering the 
volatility of 1997 and subsequently.  One cannot claim that a higher quality of regulation is the   9 
explanation. Directed lending, connected lending, corruption, and bad loans are at least as 
important in these countries as in the rest of Asia. 
 
When Korea rebounded strongly from the recession of 1998, recovering as quickly as had 
Mexico in 1995, some critics proclaimed that the V-pattern disproved the view on the parts of the 
international financial institutions and the U.S. Treasury that the cause of the crisis was crony 
capitalism: what is here termed the third generation approach.    They argued that, just as 
institutions go bad only slowly over time, they do not improve suddenly.   Therefore the crisis 
must have been due to something else, such as an unfounded speculative attack (second 
generation) or IMF malfeasance.   
 
The counter-argument is that the Korean government did undertake fundamental 
economic reforms pursuant to the late-December 1997 agreement with the IMF, for the first time 
challenging the power of both the chaebols and the labor unions.   The combination of an evident 
national economic emergency and the election of a new president with traditional anti-
establishment support (Kim Dae Jung) allowed measures to be put through that had previously 
been impossible politically.   Although the reform process may not have progressed very far by 
the time that Korean economic growth was fully restored (1999), the shift in approach worked to 
restore investor confidence from early 1998, and is sufficient to explain the turnaround.  Indeed, 
some Korean economists argue that the country was better off, in light of the reforms, than it was 
before the crisis, and even that the country might have been better off if the recovery had come 
later, to keep up pressure for reform (although one need not go that far).    Similarly, although the 
Russian devaluation and default of 1998 appeared at the time to augur disaster, in retrospect the 
crisis helped politically to bring about reforms that had previously been viewed as impossible, 
such as effective collection of taxes and hardening of firms’ budget constraints (see chapter 10, 
this volume).    
 
 Early Warning Indicators 
 
  We now turn from theory without numbers, to numbers without theory.     
 
Everyone would like to be able to predict ahead of time when a crisis will happen.  This 
is not easy to do.  Even private “rating services,” professionals who make their living by 
evaluating the risk of bonds from various issuers, have a poor track record.   Indeed, if it were 
easy to predict the date of a crisis, according to the theory of efficient markets, investors would 
not have their money in the country at that date in the first place.  But there are certain warning 
indicators that may signal that a country is at increased risk. 
 
  Traditional indicators are measures of aggregate indebtedness, such as the ratio of the 
current account deficit to GDP, the ratio of debt to GDP, or the ratio of external debt service to 
exports.  One rule of thumb is that current account deficits in excess of 4 percent of GDP enter a 
danger zone.  Such predictors are of limited use, however, and not just because they have little 
basis in theory.
11   Some countries repeatedly get into trouble at debt/GDP ratios as low as 15 
percent, whereas that level would be considered safe for others.
12    Many countries are observed 
to run large current account deficits for years, and yet are able to finance them without getting 
into trouble.  It depends, at least, on how the funds are used. 
 
  Periodically, someone will assert that a given country need not worry about a current 
account deficit, because the government budget is in balance, and thus it is only the private sector 
that is borrowing from abroad.   There is a certain logic to the argument that decisions made 
freely by consenting adults who face explicit price signals are less likely to get into trouble than  10 
governments spending somebody else’s money.  Nevertheless, this principle has gone wrong 
frequently enough to earn the name “Lawson Fallacy” (after the British finance minister who 
downplayed fears regarding his country’s current account deficit in the late 1980s).  Examples of 
countries that borrowed to finance private deficits rather than public deficits and yet experienced 
crises include Chile in 1981 and Mexico in 1994. 
 
  Out of those experiences, a new guideline emerged: a country is more likely to get into 
trouble if an inflow goes to finance consumption, instead of investment.  After all, the key to 
sustainable borrowing is to use the funds to build up a productive capital stock, so that the 
country will be able tomorrow to produce, export, and earn the foreign exchange that it will need 
to pay back the debt incurred today.  East Asian countries in the 1990s, with their high rates of 
saving and investment, seemed by this criterion unimpeachable, despite their large current 
account deficits.  Only when they too were hit by crises in 1997--98 did the flaw in this logic 
become clear.  Much of the finance had gone to investment in unprofitable heavy manufacturing 
and real estate.    A Korean firm that borrows heavily in order to invest in auto or steel factories 
may have trouble paying the money back if those sectors already have excess capacity.  
   
  Another set of indicators that appear statistically useful at predicting whether a given size 
current account deficit or external debt is likely to lead to crisis concerns the composition of the 
capital inflow.   Relevant dimensions of the composition of inflows include maturity, currency of 
denomination, bank lending vs. securities---and policy regarding reserves.
13   These variables are 
discussed below.   A conclusion to emerge from many of the studies is that the single most useful 
indicator may be the ratio of short-term external debt to reserves. 
 
  Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996) found that a combination of weak fundamentals 
(changes in real exchange rate or credit/GDP) and low reserves (relative to M2) made countries 
vulnerable to tequila contagion in 1995.  Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998) found that the 
best predictors are the real exchange rate, the ratio of M2 to reserves, GDP, and equity prices. 
Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1998, 2000) found that reserves, openness, current account balance, 
terms of trade, and world interest rates are among the indicators triggering crises and/or sharp 
reversals of the current account.
14 
 
Crisis Prevention Policies 
 
Background on many of the variables to be considered in the quantitative analysis appears in 
appendix A, which presents a brief review of other literature relevant to crisis prevention policies. 
The list includes the following topics: deep determinants that come originally from the growth 
literature (such as institutions/governance), the choice of exchange rate regime, the choice of 
capital account regime, the choice of trade openness, and the composition and use of capital 
inflows. 
 
Crisis Management Policies  
 
Once a country is hit by an abrupt cut-off in foreign willingness to lend, it hardly matters 
what was the cause.   The urgent question becomes what is the appropriate policy response.   
Often the loss in foreign financing must be taken as given.    Thus there must be a reduction of the 
same magnitude in the previous trade deficit.    How can the adjustment be accomplished?   Is a 
sharp increase in interest rates (to reduce overall spending, and increase the attractiveness of 
much-needed capital inflow) preferable to a sharp devaluation (to switch expenditure away from 
the consumption of internationally traded goods, and to switch production toward them)?
15 Many 
victims of crises in the late 1990s had to experience both.    Regardless what mix of policies has  11 
been chosen, recessions have been severe.
16    Is the output loss smaller if the country goes to the 
IMF?  
 
It would be particularly useful if we could sort out the problem of what is the desirable 
policy mix once the decision has been made to adjust a trade deficit, rather than to continue trying 
to finance it.  This has been a subject of great controversy.   The textbook framework of adjusting 
to an external imbalance via some combination of expenditure reduction and real devaluation, and 
the specific formulation in terms of traded and non-traded goods, remain among the most useful 
models for developing countries.
17   One of the most popular critiques of the management of the 
1990s crises by national authorities and the IMF–that there was too much contractionary 
monetary and fiscal policy, imposing needlessly severe recessions–can best be interpreted in this 
framework as the proposition that the countries should have followed a different policy mix, one 
with less contraction and more devaluation.
18   (This logic takes the external financing constraint 
as given: that is, it assumes that in the face of a sudden stop, the country must improve the trade 
balance one way or another.   It is also quite possible, however, that these critics are really saying 
that the international financial community should come up with more funds so the country does 
not face so sharp an adjustment.)  Others note that the devaluations were in most cases very large 
as it was; and that devaluation can be at least as bad for the balance sheets of debtor banks and 
corporations, and just as contractionary, as increases in the interest rate.  Indeed, an increase in 
the interest rate at least has the virtue, with respect to balance sheets, that if things go well it will 
come back down over the subsequent months, whereas this seldom is true of the nominal 
exchange rate.
19   It is possible a country that finds itself with short-term dollar-denominated debt, 
unwillingness by its creditors to roll over, and low reserves has few policy options left other than 
a sharp and painful output contraction.
20 
 
Appendix B elaborates on the possibility that, for a country that has waited until very late in 
the day to adjust, there may in fact be no optimal combination of devaluation and expenditure-
reducing policies that satisfy the external financing constraint and yet avoids a recession.    
 
Variables to Be Examined 
 
This section begins by establishing a statistical criterion for what is to be considered a currency 
crisis.   Then the study specifies policy variables and measures of economic performance. Appendix C 
contains details of definitions and data sources for the variables.    Appendix D lists the countries 
constituting the data sample for each of our tests. 
 
Criterion to Define a Crisis 
 
Not all speculative attacks succeed.   If there is a very sharp fall in the demand for a 
country’s assets, that can be considered a crisis even if the authorities tightened monetary policy 
sufficiently to avoid a devaluation (perhaps automatically, in a currency board, for example).   
The approach here is generally to follow Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1995) and Frankel 
and Rose (1996)
21 in using a foreign exchange market pressure index.
22    This index is defined as 
the percentage fall in reserves plus the percentage fall in the foreign exchange value of the 
currency.   The idea is that this index measures the fall in demand for the country’s currency; it is 
then up to the monetary authorities to determine whether to accommodate, by letting the money 
supply fall, or to depreciate.   To avoid treating every year of a multi-year high-inflation period as 
a separate crisis, this study requires that the increase in exchange market pressure represent an 
acceleration of at least an additional 10 percent over the preceding period; and we also adopt an 
exclusion window of 3 years.  
 
  We define a crisis event at annual frequency in four steps:  12 
1. Starting with monthly data, we compute the crisis index (IND) = percentage nominal exchange 
rate depreciation + percentage loss in foreign reserve. 
 
2. A month m for country k is labeled as a “crisis month” if IND(k, m) ￿ 25 percent,  
and IND(k, m) – IND(k, m-1) ￿ 10 percent. 
 
3. We next create a VCRISIS(k, t) variable at the annual frequency for country k and year t.  
VCRISIS(k, t) = 1 if year t for country k contains a crisis month, and 0 otherwise. 
 
4. We define a crisis event variable at the annual frequency, ECRISIS(k, t), using the value of 
VCRISIS(k, t) plus a 3-year window.  The 3-year window rule specifies that there can be no more 
than one crisis in any 3-year period. For example, if there is a string of six years in which 
VCRISIS =1, we define only the first and fourth years as crises, and disregard the other years 
from the probit estimation.  The 3-year window, used also in Frankel and Rose (1996), is 
designed to avoid the situation in which a multi-year crisis is labeled as several different crises.  
At the same time, if a country is in crisis year after year for nine years, counting them as one 
crisis would probably be insufficient. The 3-year-window rule would assign (somewhat 
arbitrarily) three crises to the period as a compromise. 
As a robustness check, we also experimented with higher and lower thresholds.  The 
probit analysis seeks to predict these events. 
 
Measures of Economic Performance 
 
  In the regression section, we considered five measures of economic performance for the 
cross-section of currencies during the sample period, 1990--2002.    
 
1.  The number of crises experienced during this period 
2.  The average depth of a country’s crises, measured as the loss of GDP relative to the 
beginning of the crisis, up until the date when GDP reattains its pre-crisis level 
3.  A composite measure, consisting of total output lost in crises: the number of years that the 
country was in crisis times the average depth of its crises 
4.  The average rate of growth during the sample period 
5.  The standard deviation of the growth rate during the sample period. 
 
Crisis Prevention Policies 
 
  We examined a number of key regressors. These variables are chosen to correspond to 
those identified by recent theories as potentially important for currency crises in developing 
countries.  The objective is to check which of these are associated with crisis events, and with 
good economic performance more generally, when they are put to compete with one another 
other in a unified regression framework. The list of key regressors includes:  
 
1.  Trade openness, as measured by the ratio of total trade to GDP  
2.  Financial openness, measured either de jure by the Klein-Quinn rating of openness, or de 
facto by the ratio of gross foreign assets plus liabilities to GDP  
3.  Institutional quality, as measured by control of corruption (ICRG) or constraints on executive 
branch of the government (Polity IV)  
4.  The ratio of external debt to GDP   
5.  Reserves/GDP  13 
6.  Measures of composition, such as the ratio of the sum of FDI and equity inflows to gross 
foreign liabilities; and the ratio of short-term debt to GDP, to FDI plus equity, or to reserves   
7.  Expansionary monetary policies, as measured by the inflation rate and, in the regression 
section, its determinants, the rate of domestic credit creation and the budget deficit as a share 
of GDP 
8.  Exchange rate regimes, as captured by a time-weighted measure of flexibility, or by a dummy 
for fixed exchange regime and another dummy for intermediate exchange rate regimes 
9.  “Original sin,” another composition variable that measures the currency mismatch arising 
from foreign liabilities denominated in dollars or other foreign currencies.  
 
   
Crisis Management Policies 
 
  One important question is whether the country adjusts promptly when faced with balance 
of payments difficulties, or postpones the adjustment. We will look at the length of time that 
passes after reserves peak, before there is a devaluation, and how much reserves are lost during 
that time.   We also consider the hypothesis that changes in the composition of liabilities during 
the period of sudden stop---toward shorter-term and toward dollar denominated---are another 
method of stalling for time, in addition to running down reserves.  We will also look at whether 
the country signed a program with the IMF.    
 
  Another interesting proposition to be tested may be that, when the day of adjustment 
comes, the mix of policies can make a difference.    We will assume that net additional 
international financing is not possible during a financial crisis and therefore take as given the 
increase in the trade balance (typically eliminating a previous deficit).    The question is whether 
this adjustment is achieved through contractionary monetary policies, which can be measured by 
the increase in the real interest rate; by contractionary fiscal policies, which can be measured by 
the increase in the budget surplus, or by real devaluation, which switches the composition of 
spending, and also encourages greater supply of tradable goods.  
 
Keeping in mind the identity that Y º A+TB, where A is spending, there are three 
categories that a country could fall into, when it adjusts so as to improve the trade balance, TB:  
(i) It could achieve an expansion, through trade-boosting policies such as devaluation or other 
expenditure-switching policies, without expenditure-reduction: DY> DA > 0 
(ii) It could achieve the improvement in the trade balance partly through expenditure reduction 
policies, but with no loss in overall output: DA<0, but DY>0 
(iii) It could achieve adjustment solely through expenditure-reduction, resulting in a contraction 
in output: DY<0.    
  
A simple way of parameterizing the policy mix is to compute the adjustment mix 
coefficient   
m   º  DY/DTB. 
We then identify the three cases by: 
 
(i)  m>1 => expansion 
(ii)  m<1 => expenditure-reduction, and  
(iii)  m < 0 => contraction.   
 
This calculation, across the set of crises that were followed by improvements in the trade balance, 
shows that all three cases occurred, but by far the most common was the first case.   But the  14 
calculation measures income relative to the pre-crisis level.  It thus misses cases of contraction 
relative to some other counterfactual, for countries with high trend growth in potential output.   
 
We will express the relative importance of monetary contraction by the change in the real 
interest rate relative to the change in the real exchange rate.  We will express the relative 
importance of fiscal contraction by the change in the budget surplus relative to the change in the 
trade balance.   The interesting question is whether there exists some combination of these 
policies that puts the country in category (ii) or even (i).   Perhaps the country is doomed to 
category (iii) if the period of sudden stop has already been spent running down reserves to low 
levels and switching the composition of liabilities toward short-term dollar loans. 
 
How Exogenous Are the Policy Variables? 
 
One more methodological point is necessary before beginning.   When we draw our 
variables from the list of candidates that are prominent in discussions of policy determinants of 
financial crises, many of them are clearly endogenous.   This is especially the case with the 
literature on early warning indicators.   Examples include the inflation rate, growth rate, 
overvaluation relative to purchasing power parity (PPP), and fraction of debt that is short-term.    
These variables are so important that they cannot be left out of the analysis, but it is important to 
bear in mind the endogeneity point throughout.     
 
At the next level of exogeneity are those that are traditionally thought of as 
macroeconomic policy variables, such as budget deficit, money growth, and choice of exchange 
rate regime.  Even these variables, however, are now often viewed as the endogenous outcome of 
deeper structural or institutional factors, such as the rule of law. Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, 
and Thaicharoen (2003), for example, argue that macroeconomic policies in developing countries 
are often the manifestation of deeper institutions and interest groups, so that an IMF requirement 
that a country devalue in order to raise the domestic price of export commodities may simply be 
offset by some other policy, such as a change in pricing by a marketing board, in order to restore 
the preceding political equilibrium. Accordingly, this study will give appropriate attention to such 
structural determinants.    At the same time, we must recognize that even the so-called structural 
or institutional factors are endogenous; there is a fourth level of exogeneity consisting of 
geographic and historical factors. 
 
Exploratory Empirical Analysis of Currency Crises 
 
The main goal is to see which of the competing claims regarding desirable policies for 
crisis prevention and crisis management are supported by the data.   But there are too many 
possible effects and combinations of effects to construct a neatly nested theoretically grounded 
framework within which to carry out the tests.    We begin, in this section, by exploring the data 
in various preliminary ways, to help point in what direction we need to concentrate our energies. 
 
Do the Most Visible Recent Crises Help Distinguish Among Hypotheses? 
 
Relative to other developing countries, a very large fraction of public attention and 
analysis has gone to fewer than a dozen emerging markets, particularly those experiencing 
dramatic currency crises and considered of systemic importance.   (“Systemic importance” 
generally means countries that are large in the financial system, although the euphemism 
sometimes extends to geopolitical significance.)   We, too, begin by considering these countries, 
before undertaking a broader and more systematic econometric analysis in subsequent sections.   
The analysis in this section will not be formal, but rather will take the approach that one clear  15 
data point (or counter-example) might be sufficient to reject the strong form of the hypothesis that 
any single factor is of overwhelming importance in determining which countries experience crises 
and which do not.
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  It does not seem possible to categorize the country experiences into first generation, 
second generation and third generation type crises.     In each historical episode, some observers 
blame macroeconomic fundamentals, some volatile financial markets, and some structural flaws.    
In truth, all these factors play a role. 
 
One can find examples to illustrate one’s favorite hypothesis regarding policies to prevent 
crises; but counterexamples abound as well.   Consider exchange rate regimes.  The crises of 
1994--2000 involved countries with intermediate regimes (bands, crawls, baskets, and adjustable 
pegs), which is why many observers considered them the root of the problem.   But a free float 
did not save Brazil from a crisis in the run-up to the presidential election of 2002, a currency 
board did not save Argentina from disaster in 2001, and intermediate exchange rate regimes such 
as those pursued by Thailand and Korea certainly did not save them from becoming crisis victims 
of 1997--99.
24    
 
Or consider crisis management.   On the one hand, the currency crises in Mexico (1994)
25 
and Thailand (1997)
26 came nine months or more after investors had started pulling out of the 
country (as reflected in reserves or stock market prices).   These cases support the hypothesis that 
early adjustment is critical, and that if a country waits until it has lost most of its reserves before 
going to the IMF and devaluing---assuming that is what it is going to have to do eventually 
anyway---the crisis will be much worse.   Exchange rate based stabilizations fail, according to the 
conventional wisdom, because of the absence of an exit strategy.   On the other hand, Russia 
engaged in the same procrastination in the first half of 1998,
27 as did Brazil later in the fall of 
1998.
28 Yet in neither case were the predictions of disaster that accompanied the devaluations in 
August 1998 and January 1999, respectively, borne out.  Ecuador lost 66 percent of its reserves 
before its currency crisis of early 2000, and suffered a correspondingly large output loss 
subsequently, while Brazil lost almost as much (52 percent of its reserves) and yet suffered no 
loss in output.   Turkey followed the advice of building in an explicit exit strategy into its 
exchange-rate based stabilization plan---an accelerated rate of crawl pre-scheduled for July 2001-
--and yet that did not help at all avoid speculative attack in February.   (Nor, interestingly, does it 
appear to have hurt, in that participants did not cite the “exit clause” as one of the reasons behind 
pressure on the balance of payments.)
29     
 
  Table 1 reports the base-case variables of interest for a set of countries that had the most 
visible crises during the 1994--2002 period (Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Indonesia, Korea, 
Mexico, Pakistan, Russia, Thailand, and Turkey).  Also reported are four non-crisis “control 
cases” (Chile, China, Hong Kong SAR, and Taiwan, Province of China), and three others of 
special interest (Colombia, Malaysia, and South Africa). 
 
  The column showing freedom from corruptness offers a possible illustration of the 
hypothesis that institutional quality is critical: Indonesia scores even more poorly than most 
developing countries, and suffered a correspondingly severe crisis in 1997--98.  Yet Argentina is 
a counterexample, having a non-corruptness score that is no worse than the average,
30 but 
suffering the most severe output loss of any country in the sample.  That Argentina had enacted 
most of the recommended institutional fixes (encouraging foreign-owned bank subsidiaries, 
taking out a contingent credit line, smoothing the term structure of obligations, and so forth) and 
yet experienced such a collapse is particularly discouraging.
31   Brazil, Pakistan, South Africa, 
and Turkey show up with egregious budget deficits; Turkey, Russia, and Brazil with the highest  16 
inflation records; Indonesia with the highest debt; Brazil with the highest credit creation; and 
Turkey with the worst currency mismatch. 
 
Table 1. The Base-Case Variables for the Sample’s Dozen Crisis Countries 
 
 
The view that wins the most support from table 1 is that countries that are not open to 
capital flows are more likely to have stable economies. It is perhaps not be surprising that 
countries that do not incur debt in the first place do not have debt crises.    Still, it is disturbing, 
from the viewpoint of pro-globalizers, that the two countries that show up as most closed to 
capital flows, China and Malaysia,
32 are also the two with the fastest average growth over the 
period since 1990. 
 
  The answer in life is almost always that more than one factor is important in determining 
performance.  A systematic analysis, to evaluate any one effect, must control for others.    The 
strongest message to emerge from table 1 is that a dozen highly visible cases is not a large enough 
sample to answer most of the questions we wish to answer.    As soon as we start considering 
alternative variables, or hypotheses regarding nonlinearities, or interaction terms, we have used 
up our degrees of freedom, to say nothing of significance levels.   Accordingly, the remainder of 
this study turns to econometrics on larger samples, generally consisting of all developing 
countries for which sufficient data are available.   (Most of the members on the former Soviet 
Union and other transition economies are excluded, mostly for lack of data and noncomparability 
before and after the fall of the Soviet Union.)   We turn now to probit models to search for robust 
correlates of crises. 
 
Probit Analysis of Crisis Probability 
 
   In this section of the paper, we describe possible correlates of currency crisis using 
standard probit models on a panel data set for the set of developing economies in the sample from 
1974--2001.  In the subsequent section, we use a regression tree technique to search for possible 
non-linear threshold effects and interactive effects. 
 
  We try a large number of different probit specifications.  The variations are:  
(qka) (share9295) Exchange R ate of M ean Std.
A bsence Absence Short-term Short-term External rate Budget increase Proportion G DP growth dev. No. A verage
Non- capital capital debt / debt / debt/ regim e deficit / dom estic tim e at per capita O riginal real real of depth of
corruptness controls controls Inflation reserves total debt G DP (flexibility) G DP credit war (1990) sin incom e incom e crises crises
A rgentina 2.79 1.00 0.75 0.37 1.36 0.19 0.41 1.23 1.17 0.15 0.01 8.66 0.69 0.02 0.07 3.00 0.08
Brazil 3.29 1.50 0.00 1.13 1.21 0.17 0.32 2.62 5.79 1.05 0.00 8.31 0.63 0.02 0.02 1.00 0.01
Chile 3.53 1.83 0.00 0.09 0.24 0.11 0.45 2.23 -1.17 0.09 0.00 8.10 0.78 0.06 0.04 0.00 0.00
China 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.29 0.17 0.16 1.62 2.03 0.13 0.00 5.86 0.40 0.09 0.02 0.00 0.00
Hong K ong SA R 4.33 4.00 1.00 0.04 . . . 1.62 0.00 0.05 0.00 9.84 0.87 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.00
Colom bia 2.13 1.50 0.00 0.17 0.47 0.15 0.36 2.31 1.93 0.16 0.07 7.66 0.80 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.00
Ecuador 3.08 2.33 0.50 0.04 1.64 0.15 . 1.77 -1.11 0.14 0.01 7.30 0.75 0.02 0.03 2.00 0.03
Indonesia            2.01 2.50 1.00 0.12 1.40 0.18 0.79 2.31 0.06 0.12 0.01 6.66 0.32 0.04 0.06 1.00 0.10
K orea 3.99 1.67 0.00 0.05 0.99 0.35 0.23 2.46 0.34 0.09 0.00 8.98 0.62 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.00
M alaysia             3.81 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.28 0.19 0.43 1.46 -1.15 0.10 0.00 8.04 0.37 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.00
M exico 3.00 2.00 0.00 0.16 1.59 0.19 0.37 2.62 0.09 0.12 0.00 8.07 0.64 0.03 0.04 1.00 0.02
Pakistan 2.46 1.17 0.00 0.08 3.10 0.10 0.52 2.00 6.92 0.09 0.01 6.11 0.80 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00
Russia 2.37 . 0.79 1.69 0.11 0.39 2.36 2.31 0.00 0.02 8.21 0.73 -0.03 0.09 1.00 0.03
South A frica         4.62 1.17 0.00 0.09 23.37 0.40 0.18 3.00 4.38 0.00 0.03 8.32 0.83 0.02 0.02 1.00 0.02
Taiw an, Prov.of China 3.55 . 0.02 . . . 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 . 0.43 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.00
Thailand             2.61 1.50 0.00 0.04 2.78 0.33 0.58 1.77 0.39 0.10 0.00 7.60 0.33 0.04 0.06 1.00 0.01
Turkey               2.64 1.17 0.00 0.54 1.82 0.21 0.47 2.23 8.03 0.41 0.05 7.85 0.87 0.03 0.06 2.00 0.06
M ean (above countries) 3.13 1.56 0.22 0.22 2.82 0.20 0.40 2.15 1.76 0.16 0.01 7.85 0.64 0.04 0.04 0.76 0.02
Note:
qka: A verage of K lein' s interpretation of Quinn' s variable qka for years 1973, 1982, and 1988, gauging capital account openness (higher value=m ore open).
share9295: Proportion of period 1992--95 that country had open capital accounts or undertook financial liberalization.
Source: A uthor' s calculations.
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(a) including the year dummies, or not; (b) including the country fixed effects, or not; (c) 
measuring institutional quality by control of corruption versus constraint on executive branch of 
the government; (d) including the ratio of short-term external debt to reserve ratio, or not  (since 
this variable is not available for a number of countries/years, its exclusion enlarges the sample 
size); and (e) defining currency crisis using three different thresholds for a “crisis month”: 15 
percent, 25 percent, and 35 percent.  This gives a total of 48 regressions (2
4 X 3 = 48). 
 
  To simplify the presentation, table 2 reports a summary of these 48 regressions.  Column 
1 reports a sample regression with all the regressors, plus year and country fixed effects. Column 
2 is a similar regression, this time replacing the variable “control of corruption” by “constraint on 
executive branch of the government.”   (Other individual Probit regression results are reported in 
appendix E.)  
 
Table 2. Summary of the Probit Regressions 
 
  Sample Regressions    Summary of Results       
  Pos Significant  Neg Significant   
Variable     
  10%  20%  10%  20%   
Contributor to 
crisis? 
  (1)  (2)    (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)    (7) 
Trade openness  0.006  -0.003    1/48  5/48  2/48  4/48    Not important 
  (0.006)  (0.009)               
Financial  0.001  -0.029    3/48  5/48  2/48  6/48    Not important 
openness  (0.003)  (0.019)               
Low corruption  0.056      0/24  0/24  0/24  0/24    Not important 
  (0.103)                 
Contraint on    -0.005    0/24  0/24  1/24  2/24    Not important 
executives    (0.093)               
Stdebt/Reserve  0.539  1.913    23/48  37/48  0/48  0/48    Very likely + 
  (0.796)  (1.91)               
Debt/GDP  -2.52E-04  0.008    9/48  10/48  0/48  0/48    Not important 
  (0.001)  (0.004)               
(FDI+ptf)  -0.008  -0.010    0/24  0/24  9/24  13/24    Likely - 
/Gross liability  (0.003)  (0.005)               
inflation  2.06E-04  3.01E-04    15/48  28/48  0/48  0/48    Very likely + 
  (1.57E-04)  (1.88E-04)               
Fixed exchange  -0.246  0.350    0/48  1/48  1/48  4/48    Not important 
rate regime  (0.256)  (0.421)               
Intermediate  -0.377  -0.188    0/48  1/48  13/48  16/48    Likely - 
ex. rate regime  (0.223)  (0.344)               
Country dummy  yes  yes               
Year dummy  yes  yes               
No.  observations  635  269               
Source: Authors’ calculations 
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  Column 3 of table 2 reports, for each regressor, in how many cases the coefficient is 
positive and statistically significant at the 10 percent level, relative to the total number of 
regressions in which the variable appears.  For example, the first number in Column 3, 1/48, 
means that the regressor, “trade openness,” appears in 48 Probit regressions, out of which, one is 
positive and statistically significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level.  Column 4 
reports, for each regressor, how many times it is positive and significant at the 20 percent level, 
relative to the total number of regressions it appears.  Similarly, Columns 5 and 6 report, for each 
regressor, how many cases it is negative and significant at the 10 percent and 20 percent levels, 
respectively, relative to the total number of regressions it appears. 
 
  The last column in table 2 presents our judgment on how likely a given variable is 
associated with a currency crisis.  We label a variable as a “very likely” contributor to crisis if it 
is statistically significant at the 20 percent level more than half of the time and has a consistent 
sign in most regressions.  We label a variable as a “likely” contributor to crisis if it is statistically 
significant at the 20 percent level for between 20 percent and 50 percent of the regressions and 
have a consistent sign in most cases.  We label a variable as “not important” for crisis in all other 
cases. 
 
  The labels of “very likely” and “likely” contributors to crisis are generous, not only 
because of the definition used above but also because we look only at correlates within the 
sample (that is, no cross-sample validation is used to further reduce significant variables).  Even 
so, only two variables qualify as “very likely” contributors to crisis.  They are the ratio of short-
term external debt to foreign exchange reserve, and expansionary monetary policy (inflation). 
Both of them are likely to be positively related to the probability of crisis. 
 
  Two variables satisfy the generous definition for a “likely” contributor to crisis.  The first 
is the ratio of FDI and equity inflows to gross foreign liabilities. This is likely to decrease the 
chance of a crisis. The second is the intermediate exchange rate regime. This is less likely to be 
associated with crisis than the floating exchange rate regime. 
 
  According to these results, the remaining variables are not likely to be important for 
currency crises---even judged by the generous criteria above.  It may be particularly worth 
highlighting two such variables.  First, financial openness is not robustly associated with crisis, 
one way or the other.  Second, a fixed exchange rate regime is no more likely to be in crisis than a 
flexible exchange rate regime. 
 
  The recent literature on financial crisis has proposed a number of possible non-linear 
“threshold” effects.  For example, the financial openness on crisis probability may be hump-
shaped. Some intermediate range of financial openness may be more crisis-prone than either low 
or high levels of financial openness.  As another example, a combination of fixed exchange rate 
and high financial openness may be particularly prone to currency crisis. Or a combination of 
weak institutions (high corruption) and financial openness may make a country particularly 
vulnerable to speculative attacks on its currency.  One could add quadratic terms or interactive 
terms to the above probit specification to capture some of these “threshold” effects.  However, 
such terms are likely to be arbitrary and inflexible. The discussion that follows turns to the 
technique of regression tree analysis.  This approach potentially can nest all such threshold and 
interactive effects and identify them in a relatively flexible way. 
 
The Use of Regression Tree Analysis of Crisis Probability to Search for 
Threshold/Interactive Relationships 
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  A regression tree is a data classification tool that performs a function analogous to factor 
analysis, but in a much more flexible way.  While it is less familiar to economists, it has been 
used in statistical analysis of medical data to identify non-linear, interactive, or threshold patterns.  
We first illustrate the basic idea with an example, and then explain how we can apply the 
technique to our context. 
   
  The regression tree technique has three main advantages over linear regression that 
makes it suitable for our purpose. First, the same regressor does not have to have the same effect 
on the dependent variable in different ranges of value.  In particular, the regression tree technique 
permits one or multiple threshold effects for any given regressor. Second, it identifies complex 
interactive relationships–how different combinations of variables in different data ranges could 
affect the dependent variable–in a relatively flexible way. Third, the classification result by the 
regression tree technique is invariant to monotonic transformations (such as logarithmic or 
quadratic transformations) of the explanatory variables. 
 
Illustration of the basic idea.   To illustrate the idea, we use a simplified version of a 
real-world medical example reported by Leo Breiman and his colleagues (Breiman and others 
1984): how to classify heart attack patients into a high-risk group (those who would not survive in 
the next 30 days after testing) and a low-risk group (those who would live longer), using a small 
number of variables, so that they can be treated accordingly.   The medical study has collected 
information on 19 different potentially relevant variables from a sample of patients.  The 
regression tree technique searches for a data classification rule (splitting data into different 
branches and nodes) so that the difference between the predicted and actual values (sum of 
residual squared) are sufficiently small. The classification also identifies which subset of 
explanatory variables is most important, and how they can be used to classify the data into 
different terminal nodes.  
 
In this example, the final classification rule identified three variables as most important: 
minimum systolic blood pressure over the initial 24 hour period, age, and presence of sinus 
tachycardia.  But they exhibit thresholds and interact with one another non-linearly.  More 
precisely, if a single variable–minimum systolic blood pressure–exceeds a threshold (91), then the 
patient should be in the high-risk group. No need to look at other variables.  Otherwise, it depends 
on the interaction of two other variables.  In particular, a combination of high age (>62.5) and 
presence of sinus tachycardia would again classify the patient to the high-risk group.  In all other 
cases, the patient should be classified into the low-risk group. This statistical result can be 
described by a tree-like graph; hence the name of the statistical technique (see figure 1.) 
 














  M in blood pressure > 91 
Age < 62.5  High risk
Low risk  Sinus tachycardia=no? 
Low risk  High risk
Source: Breiman and others (1984).  20 
If the number and nature of thresholds, the needed transformation of the variables, and 
the pattern of variable interactions are known, one can modify a linear regression specification by 
adding suitably transformed variables, higher-order polynomial terms, interactive terms, and the 
like, to capture these relationships.  If they are not known, then the regression tree is a more 
flexible approach to identify data patterns. 
 
Applying the technique to the problem of currency crises. To implement the regression 
tree technique, one must decide on three parameters (similar to deciding on the size of a t-test or 
F-test, or choosing the convergence criteria in a maximum likelihood estimation of a regression). 
In addition, one must choose a list of candidate explanatory variables. The first parameter is 
mincut, the minimum number of observations needed before a first cut on a variable. The second 
parameter is minsize, the minimum number of observations before the last split.  The statistical 
package we use (S-plus) requires minsize to be equal to at least twice the value of mincut. The 
third parameter is deviance, the tolerable level of sum of the square of the residuals for the 
variables at a given node.  It is the amount of heterogeneity that can be tolerated without further 
splitting.  Each of the three parameters could be a sufficient condition to stop splitting the data 
further. 
 
  The statistical literature does not provide definite guidance on how to choose these 
parameters.  If one picks numbers for these parameters that are too small, then the sample may be 
split into too many branches and terminal nodes. In this case, sample variations and noises would 
clutter the reported data pattern.  If one picks too big values for these parameters, the sample 
classification may be too coarse to be useful. 
 
  In the context of the currency crisis data, we have experimented with various possible 
values and discovered the following regularities. To err on the side of too fine a classification, we 
choose mincut = 1 percent of the sample, minsize =2 x mincut, and deviance = 0.01. In this case, 
there would be a large number of combinations of variables that would generate a high crisis 
probability.  These cases are not easily ranked in terms of the values of variables, reflecting in 
part the noise created by sample variation. This set of values (mincut = 1 percent of the sample) 
can be regarded as the lower bound for the three parameters that we wish to consider.  
 
   On the other end, we choose mincut = 5 percent of the sample, minsize =  2 x mincut, and 
deviance = 0.01.  In this case, there will often be only one combination of variables that will 
generate a crisis probability of 50 percent or higher.  Any higher values for mincut or minsize 
would typically not generate any combination of explanatory variables that are associated with a 
crisis probability of 50 percent or higher.  This set of values therefore may be the upper bound of 
the parameters that we wish to consider. 
 
Deviance = 0.01 is small enough that it is almost never used as a stopping rule.  Thus 
how fine the sample/“tree” is split is essentially determined by the choice of mincut (and 
minsize). 
 
The results of the regression tree analysis. We now turn to the actual statistical results.  The 
list of the potential explanatory variables is similar to before, including:  
(1) Trade openness, as measured by the ratio of total trade to GDP  
(2) De facto financial openness, as measured by the ratio of gross foreign assets plus liabilities to 
GDP 
(3) Institutional quality, as measured by constraint on executive branch of the government 
(4) Ratio of short-term debt to GDP  
(5) Ratio of external debt to GDP   21 
(6) Ratio of the sum of FDI and equity inflows to gross foreign liabilities  
(7) Expansionary monetary policies, as measured by inflation rate 
(8) Exchange rate regimes, as captured by a dummy for fixed exchange rate regime and another 
dummy for intermediate exchange rate regimes.  
In addition, we also add decade dummies to allow for the possibility that crises are more frequent 
in one decade than in another, even if the values of other variables are held constant. 
 
  In the first case, there are 456 observations in total. We choose mincut = 5 percent of the 
sample size, minsize = 10 percent of the sample size, and deviance = 0.01.  The results can be 
reported in two ways: a visually intuitive tree-graph (with less information); and a somewhat 
cumbersome long form of description (with more information).  In this case, we report both in the 
upper and lower panels of figure 2, respectively. Out of the long list of possible variables, two 
variables are determined by the regression tree technique to be most important: ratio of short-term 
external debt to foreign reserve, and rate of inflation.  When the ratio of short-term debt to reserve 
exceeds 157 percent and rate of inflation exceeds 17.2 percent, then there is a 50 percent 
probability of a crisis. (The long description in the lower panel of figure 2 reveals that 26 country-
years fall into the bin in which short-term debt to reserve ratio exceeding 157 percent and 
inflation exceeding 17.2 percent. Of the 26 cases, half of them are crisis episodes.)  Other than 
this combination of variables, there does not exist any other combination of variables (from the 
universe of all variables specified above) that would generate a crisis probability of 50 percent or 
higher (for any sub-sample of observations that satisfy the parameters specified).
33  Therefore, the 
regression tree analysis suggests the combination of a high short-term debt to reserve ratio and a 
high inflation rate is likely to be lethal in terms of a proclivity for a currency crisis. 
 
Figure 2. Crisis Classification, Relatively Broad Cuts 
 
(mincut = 5% of sample size, minsize = 10% of sample, deviance = 0.01) 
 








Panel 2. Long Description 
Total number of observations = 456 
Pseudo R-squared = 1-51/441 = 88% 
Average crisis probability = 20% 
 
Reporting convention: 
Split rule, #observation, deviance(X100), crisis probability 
 
Stdebt/RES < 1.57  347  30  0.10   
 
Stdebt/RES > 1.57  109  20  0.30 
 
    inflation<17.2%  83  20  0.30   
    inflation>17.2%  26   7   0.50 * 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
STdebt/Res < 1.57 
Inflation < 17.22  0.1 
0.3  0.5  22 
 
  In the second case, we have the same list of variables and the same sample, but choose 
smaller values for the key parameters. In particular, we let mincut = 3 percent of the sample size, 
minsize = twice of the mincut, and deviance = 0.01. The results (both the tree-graph and long 
descriptive form) are reported in figure 3. When the minimum permissible node size is made 
smaller, more nodes (and more tree branches) would be generated.  As before, a combination of 
high short-term debt to reserve ratio (exceeding 157 percent) and a high inflation rate (exceeding 
17.2 percent) would still generate a high crisis probability. In addition, even in scenarios in which 
short-term debt to reserve ratio is below the threshold of 157 percent, a combination of a high 
inflation rate (exceeding 24.5 percent per year) and a high ratio of external debt to GDP 
(exceeding 80.1 percent) would also land a country into a situation of high crisis probability. (The 
long form reveals that 15 observations are in that bin, of which 9 are crisis episodes.)   
 
Figure 3. Crisis Classification, Intermediate Cuts 
 
(mincut = 3% of sample size, minsize = 6% of sample, deviance = 0.01) 
 













Panel 2. Long description 
 
Total number of observations = 456 
Pseudo R-squared = 1-48/436 = 89% 
Average crisis probability = 20% 
 
Reporting convention: 
Split rule, #observation, deviance(X100), crisis probability 
 
 
Stdebt/RES < 1.57  347  30.0  0.10 
   
  Inflation < 24.5%  268  20.0   0.08   
  Inflation > 24.5%   79   10.0   0.20   
 
      External Debt/GDP < 80.1%  64   7.0  0.10   
      External Debt/GDP > 80.1%  15   4.0   0.60 * 
 
STdebt/RES > 1.57 109 20.0 0.30   
 
  inflation<17.2%  83  20.0   0.30   
  inflation>17.2%  26   7.0    0.50 * 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
STdebt/RES < 1.57 
Inflation < 17.22 
0.3  0.5 
Inflation < 24.53 
0.08  Debt/GDP < 80.09 
0.1  0.6  23 
Other than these two combinations of variables, there does not exist any other 
combination of variables in the sample that could generate a crisis probability of 50 percent or 
higher (for any sub-set of observations that satisfy the parameters specified).  Therefore, the 
regression tree analysis identifies three variables---ratio of external debt to GDP, in addition to 
ratio of short-term external debt to reserve and inflation---as the most important variables that can 
help classify country-years into high versus low probabilities of crisis. Note that the effect of 
these variables on the crisis probability is not linear, and depends on how they are combined. 
 
  Perhaps as telling as what has been chosen by the regression tree is what has not been 
chosen. For example, financial openness and institutional quality are not chosen.  If there is a 
hump-shaped relationship between financial openness and currency crisis, or if there is a 
particular combination of weak institutions and high financial openness that would make a 
country vulnerable to crisis, the analysis suggests that these relationships are either not robust or 
are quantitatively unimportant (assuming that these variables are well-measured in the sample).  
Similarly, no decade dummies are selected by the regression tree, implying a lack of strong 
evidence that one decade is more crisis-prone than any other, once one takes into account the 
values of the other variables. 
 
  We could generate even finer classifications by letting mincut = 1 percent of the sample, 
minsize = 2 percent of the sample, and deviance = 0.01. This would naturally generate even more 
tree branches and even more cases of high crisis probability (with fewer observations in each of 
the node). Because the tree-graph becomes too messy, we choose to report only the long 
descriptive form in figure 4.  While the result is reported for completeness, we think that the 
increase in the number of variable combinations that can generate crisis involves terminal nodes 
with too few observations.  The influence of sample variation (noise) is likely to have increased 
in this case.  So the resulting classification is likely much less robust to out-of-sample validation 
than the previous two cases.  Consequently, we would not wish to generalize too much from this 
particular result. 
 
Figure 4. Crisis Classification, Relatively Fine Cuts 
 
(mincut = 1% of sample size, minsize = 2% of sample, deviance = 0.01) 
 
Long Description  
Total number of observations=456,   Pseudo R-squared=1-32/415 = 92% 
Average crisis probability = 20% 
 
Reporting convention:  Node), Split rule, #observation, deviance(X100), crisis probability 
 
1)Root 
2)STdebt/RES<157% 347 30.0 0.10   
      4) inflation<24.5% 268 20.0 0.08   
         8) cfdiequ<73% 17  4.0 0.30   
                16) cfdiequ<46% 11  0.9 0.09   
                17) cfdiequ>46% 6  1.0 0.70 * 
             9) cfdiequ>74% 251 20.0 0.07   
            18) debt/gdp<240% 6  1.0 0.30 * 
            19) debt/gdp>240% 245 10.0 0.06   
                38) tradeopen<50% 131 10.0 0.09   
                    76) tradeopen<49% 125  7.0 0.06   
                77) tradeopen>49% 6  1.0 0.70 * 
               39) tradeopen>50% 114  3.0 0.03   
       5) inflation>24.5% 79 10.0 0.20    24 
     10) tradeopen<74% 67  8.0 0.10   
            20) debtgdp<86% 62  5.0 0.10   
            21) debtgdp>86% 5  1.0 0.60 * 
       11) tradeopen>74% 12  3.0 0.70   
            22) tradeopen<101% 5  0.0 1.00 * 
         23) tradeopen>101% 7  2.0 0.40 * 
3)STdebtRES>157% 109 20.0 0.30   
   6) inflation<17% 83 20.0 0.30   
        12) finopen<6.84 40  9.0 0.30   
            24) debt/gdp<28.5% 8  0.0 0.00 * 
         25) debt/gdp>28.5% 32  8.0 0.40   
             50) cfdiequ<8% 7  1.0 0.70 * 
                 51) cfdiequ>8% 25  6.0 0.40   
                      102) STdebt/RES<250% 6  1.0 0.70 * 
                    103) STdebt/RES>250% 19  4.0 0.30   
         13) finopen>6.84 43  6.0 0.20   
             26) debt/gdp<368% 38  4.0 0.10   
             27) debt/gdp>368% 5  1.0 0.60 * 
    7) inflation>17.2222 26  7.0 0.50   
         14) inflation<28.0874 6  0.0 1.00 * 
         15) inflation>28.0874 20  5.0 0.30   
             30) STdebtRES<0.0235644 11  3.0 0.50   
                 60) cfdiequ<18.2002 5  0.8 0.80 * 
                 61) cfdiequ>18.2002 6  1.0 0.30 * 
             31) STdebt/RES>0.0235644 9  0.9 0.10 * 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
  As a robustness check, we have also varied the crisis definition using the 35 percent (and 
15 percent) threshold to identify crisis month (and hence the crisis year).  The results are not 
reported to save space. The qualitative results are broadly similar to what is described above. 
 
  We have also conducted similar regression tree analyses using control of corruption 
instead of constraint on executives as a measure of institutional quality.  The results are similar in 




  The findings of this section are consistent with the previous literature on leading 
indicators of currency crises: high levels of external debt do not necessarily lead to crises on their 
own, but they do significantly raise the probability of crisis if capital inflow is tilted to the short 
term and is not used (in part) to build up reserves.    Accordingly, we will want to pay special 
attention to the composition of capital and use of inflows in the next section of the study.   At the 
same time, we must recognize that identifying a variable such as the ratio of short-term debt to 
reserves as a significant predictor of currency crises does not mean that we can necessarily 
distinguish among competing theories or choose the best policies for crisis prevention or crisis 
management.   Debt and inflation are certainly endogenous, with respect to fiscal and monetary 
policy.    
 
The composition of capital inflows can be endogenous, as well.   It is not necessarily a 
deliberate policy decision to borrow short term, to borrow in dollars, or to borrow through bank 
loans rather than FDI.   It may be the result of some deep structural cause, such as crony 
capitalism
34 or original sin.
35   Or a shift in composition could be a consequence of suddenly  25 
reduced foreign willingness to hold domestic assets, together with the authorities’ determination 
not to devalue.    That is, it could be a symptom of the sudden stop, rather than a cause.   
  
The procrastination interpretation, for example, fits the shift in capital flows to Mexico 
during the course of 1994 toward the short term and toward the dollar-denominated, as the 
government substituted tesobonos (short-term dollar-linked bonds) for Cetes (peso bonds) as a 
stop-gap measure. The aim was to delay a painful choice between devaluing and continuing to 
lose reserves.   In other words, the change in composition was a stalling tactic, analogous to a 
financially troubled household that starts charging its mortgage payments on its credit card.    
 
Delayed adjustment---the lag from the date that reserves peak after a sudden stop to the 
date of a devaluation, restructuring, or an IMF program---may raise the ratio of short-term debt to 
reserves so much that an eventual crisis becomes more likely.   Furthermore, if, as a result of 
delayed adjustment, the country goes into the crisis with a high proportion of dollar-denominated 
and short-term debt, then it may be more likely that the subsequent recession will be steep, 
whatever changes in macro policies are then adopted. At that point, there may be no optimal 
combination of expenditure reduction and devaluation that avoids a sharp loss in output.
36   The 
lesson would be a more subtle story than simple admonitions to developing country policymakers 
to avoid borrowing short-term. The crisis Probit models cannot answer such questions, because 
they are not designed to do so, either with respect to their explanatory variables or with respect to 
what is being explained.  Clearly more hypothesis testing is required. 
 
Testing Hypotheses Regarding Economic Performance 
 
We test, first, if there are any policies of crisis prevention that seem consistently to have 
given countries better economic performance on average since 1990.    Subsequently, we look at 
crisis management policies. 
 
Seven Measures of Crisis Prevention Policies 
 
As noted, this study constructed a measure of output lost in crisis---crisisloss (or 
Compcrisis)--- intended to be a composite measure of a country’s proneness to severe crises. To 
see the effects of the seven “crisis prevention” policy variables, our first base-case regression, is 
equation 1.    We condition on initial income per capita, and also include a variable for war (with 
the scored severity of each conflict weighted by the number of years).
37   The two macroeconomic 
variables are taken to be debt/GDP and inflation, in light of the empirical success of the latter in 
the preceding section. 
 
                    (1) 
Crisisloss = a + b1 Noncorruptness + b2 opencapital +b3 gdpcap90 +b4 inflatn +b5 
external debt/gdp + b6 compshort + b7 origsin + b8 war +b9 exrateflex + u 
 
The results are reported in table 3. Neither of the macroeconomic variables is highly 
significant.   But the composition of capital inflows is more important.   The coefficient of 
original sin (that is, the currency mismatch) is significant at low levels, with the hypothesized 
sign.    Noncorruptness has the expected effect, and is significant.   The open capital markets 
variable has a negative sign, suggesting that liberalization actually reduces the frequency or 
severity of crises.   This is the same result found, for example, by Reuven Glick and Michael 
Hutchison (2002).  The effect appears to be significant at the 95 percent level when we use the 
Klein (2003) measure of capital account liberalization (which is based on data for 1973--85), 
though not when the updated Quinn (1997) measure is used (1992--95). Exchange rate flexibility- 26 
--if anything---appears to make crises worse, rather than better.   Fans of currency boards and 
other institutional fixes are likely to like this result, but the effect is not statistically significant.   
War and initial income have no discernible effect.    
 
 
Table 3. Explaining Output Lost in Crises: Base Case Regression 
 
  Using qka 
a    Using share 
b   












































Constant  -.104 
(.137) 
Number of obs = 67 
F(10,56) = 1.02 
Prob>F = 0.4370 
R-sqd = 0.1977 
-.049 
(.123) 
Number of obs = 68 
F(10,57) = 0.72 
Prob>F = 0.7048 
R-sqd = 0.1620 
Note: 
Macro variables are inflation and external debt.   
a. Regression uses average of Klein’s interpretation of Quinn’s variables qka73, qka82, qka85 as gauge for 
“absence of capital controls.” 
b. Regression uses Klein’s “share9295” variable as gauge for “absence of capital controls.” 
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
 
Equation 2 replaces debt/GDP and inflation, which seem too endogenous to call policy 
variables, with budget deficit/GDP and the rate of credit creation (growth in net domestic assets).    
At the same time, it drops the war variable.   Credit creation shows up with the right sign, but not 
with statistical significance.   One possible interpretation of its weak effect is that, while the 
first generation speculative attack models give it a starring role as villain, the growth literature 
considers it just the opposite, viewing increases in the ratio of domestic credit to GDP a reflection 
of financial development--- and thus beneficial.
38   The budget deficit effect shows up better 
(particularly in those regressions where the 1990s measure of capital account liberalization is 
used in place of the 1980s measure).    Two other variables do show up (at moderate levels of 
statistical significance): noncorruptness and original sin (currency mismatch).    Countries tend to 
have fewer crises or less severe ones if they are free from corruption, and tilt the composition of 
their capital inflows away from dollar-denomination.  Open capital markets are again marginally 
significant, and in a direction that suggests that liberalization actually reduces the frequency or 
severity of crises.   
 
                    (2) 
Crisisloss = a + b1 Noncorruptness + b2 opencapital +b3 gdpcap90 +b4 credit +b5 bdgdp 
+ b6 compshort + b7 origsin + b8 war +b9 exrateflex + u  
 
  27 
There are two obvious problems with the specification for the exchange rate regime 
variable.  One is that the move from a fixed exchange rate regime to a flexible one sometime 
during the decade may be the result of a currency crisis, rather than the cause.  This is an 
argument for being more precise about the timing.   The other possible objection would come 
from proponents of either the hard peg school of thought, or the corners hypothesis: that the 
exchange rate flexibility variable does not allow a test of their point of view.    
 
Accordingly, we tested for each of these hypotheses.    For the hard peg option, we 
defined a dummy variable that is equal to 1 only for currency boards, dollarization, and monetary 
unions---not for conventional pegs.     The sign is as often negative as positive, and is not at all 
significant.   Thus there is no evidence to support the claims for the hard peg.     The estimated 
coefficient on the hard peg dummy points to amelioration of crises, but it is not at all statistically 
significant.  
 
Next we tested the corners hypothesis, with a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for either 
a hard peg or a float.  In both cases, the dummy variable countries that had a corner regime during 
only part of the sample period receive the corresponding proportional weight on that regime.￿The 
results are not reported, to save space. ￿  The coefficient on the corner regimes–either hard peg or 
float---often attains low or moderate levels of significance.  But it is of the opposite sign from the 
corners hypothesis.  In other words, it rejects the popular hypothesis that the corner regimes are 
less crisis-prone than the intermediate regimes.  This is consistent with the results regarding 





Before testing for some other combinations of policy variables, we checked the effects of 
the base-case list of variables on other more familiar measures of country performance.  We tried 
defining the dependent variable, the measure of performance, to be the standard deviation of 
growth.   This measure of performance is correlated with the crisis measure, as one would expect.  
(The correlation is 0.2101.)     We add the standard deviation of the terms of trade as an obvious, 
and largely exogenous, determinant of volatility.   It rarely shows significance, however (as is 
also true when the dependent variable is one of the crisis measures, in results not reported.)    The 
only variable to show even marginal levels of significance in determining volatility is 
noncorruptness, which reduces the standard deviation of growth, as one would hope. 
 
Next we tried the average growth rate over the 1990--2002 period as the dependent 
variable.  This equation is intended as a bridge to the large literature on the determinants of 
economic growth.   Drawing on some of the conclusions from that literature, the list of variables 
include initial income, size of the country (population), tropical location, and two measures of 
factor accumulation: investment/GDP, and a measure of education or human capital.  The 
coefficient on education is of only marginal significance, and that on investment is of no 
significance.   Other authors have found measurement problems as being very important in the 
performance of these variables.   Population is highly significant, confirming that larger countries 
have an advantage.    A high ratio of short-term debt to equity and FDI shows a negative effect on 
growth that is statistically significant.    The same is true of exchange rate flexibility.   
Noncorruptness also shows a beneficial effect on growth, if again of marginal significance.    This 
estimation could be refined by use of some of the measures that the most recent growth research 
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  Many of the interesting claims in the recent literature concern the effects of combinations 
of our variables. To test for interaction effects, we return to the composite crisis variable (total 
output lost in crises) as the measure of performance.    
 
The proposed hypotheses of interactive effects involving capital account openness did not 
receive much support here.   When the capital account variables is interacted with 
noncorruptness, or with the measure of monetary policy (domestic credit creation, NDA), the 
estimates are insignificant.   In the case of fiscal policy, the finding is worse: we can reject, at 
least at low significance levels, the hypothesis that the combination of open capital markets and a 
high budget deficit worsens the crisis problem.   This does not mean that the two variables 
considered individually do not increase the frequency or severity of crises in an additive way; it is 
just that we have found nothing particularly noteworthy about the combination of the two.   
 
In the cases regarding the composition of capital inflows, the answer is worse still: the 
coefficient appears to be statistically significant, but again of a sign that is the opposite of the 
proposed direction. We reject the hypothesized deadliness of the combination of open capital 
markets and short-tilted composition, and also reject the hypothesis regarding the deadliness of 
the combination of open capital markets and currency mismatch.  The view that the combination 
of open capital markets and fixed exchange rates causes crises also receives no support.    This is 
not an encouraging result for most of the interaction effects. 
 
Table 4.1. Explaining Output Lost in Crises: Interaction of Absence of Capital Controls and 1990 
Per Capita GDP 
   
  Using qka   
Variable  Coefficient 
(std. error) 
Noncorruptness  -.055 # 
(.034) 
Absence of capital controls  -.184 * 
(.098) 
Growth of domestic credit  .042 
(.104) 
Budget deficit/GDP  .005 
(.004) 
Short-term debt/Total debt  -.132 
(.192) 
FDI/GDP  -.012 # 
(.009) 
Currency mismatch  .145 # 
(.104) 
GDP per capita (1990)  .001 
(.013) 
Exchange rate (flexibility)  .048 
(.053) 
Absence of capital controls * GDP 
per capita (1990) 
.022 * 
(.012) 
Constant  .051 
(.125) 
Number of obs = 67 
F(10,56) = 0.85 
Prob>F = 0.5854 
R-sqd = 0.1675 
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Table 4.2. Explaining Output Lost in Crises: Interaction of Absence of Capital Controls and 1990 
Per Capita GDP 
 
  Using qka   
Variable  Coefficient 
(std. error) 
Noncorruptness  -.056 # 
(.039) 
Absence of capital controls  -.287 ** 
(.134) 
Growth of domestic credit  .044 
(.113) 
Budget deficit/GDP  .005 
(.004) 
Short-term debt/Reserves  .284 * 
(.166) 
Currency mismatch  .168 # 
(.110) 
GDP per capita (1990)  -.007 
(.015) 
Exchange rate (flexibility)  .054 
(.054) 
Absence of capital controls * GDP 
per capita (1990) 
.035 ** 
(.017) 
Constant  .036 
(.122) 
Number of obs = 66 
F(8,57) = 0.86 
Prob>F = 0.5513 
R-sqd = 0.1387 
     Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
The one interactive effect that shows up highly significant is reported in tables 4.1 and 
4.2.   The variable that interacts open capital markets and income shows a positive sign and is 
significant at the 95 percent level.  This is the opposite of the finding of Javier Gomez Biscarri, 
Sebastian Edwards, and Fernando Perez de Gracia (2003). It might be rationalized by a Kuznets-
style U-shaped relationship: open capital markets can lead to heavy borrowing and thereby to 
crises in middle-income countries, but are less dangerous in poor countries and rich (the latter not 
being present in our sample).    
 
A few other variables here are statistically significant, as well.  Countries with more open 
capital markets again show up here as having reduced frequency or severity of crises, now 
significant at the 95 percent level. An increase in the ratio of short-term debt to reserves increases 
the frequency or severity of crises.   Noncorruptness and currency mismatch have the 
hypothesized effects, but at fairly low levels of significance.   In this regression, the rate of 
growth of domestic credit, the budget deficit, and the exchange rate regime variable do not attain 
statistically significance. 
 
Crisis Management Policies 
 
  We now turn to the merits of differing approaches to managing crises after they happen.  
This is rather different from analyzing policies to prevent crises--- notwithstanding the 
importance of realizing that crisis prevention policies carry important implications forcrisis 
management policies, particularly in the form of moral hazard generated by bailouts.     
 
  The approach begins by looking at the month-by-month statistical profile of reserves in 
crisis episodes.  We retain our previous definition of what constitutes a crisis: an increase in 
exchange market pressure that exceeds the threshold in absolute terms (although to focus on the 
larger crises, we raise the threshold in this section to 45 percent) and also exceeds a threshold for 
acceleration relative to the preceding month (still 10 percent). 
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The period of sudden stop: From reserve peak to crisis. We define the period of sudden 
stop as the span of time that ends with the crisis itself and begins with the preceding peak in 
reserves.  It marks the end of a period of inflow, and the beginning of the period of outflow.     
We use a 7-month centered moving average of reserves to identify the peak that precedes each 
crisis.  In our calculations, the average length of the period of sudden stop is 6.3 months.     Much 
of the literature, both theoretical and academic, essentially assumes that this period is collapsed to 
a single instance, thereby losing sight of some important questions. 
 
  Figures 5.1--5.5 are bar graphs showing the time-profile of reserves for some prominent 
crises of the last eight years (Mexico, 1994; Indonesia, 1998; Russia, 1998; Brazil, 1999, Turkey, 
2001). Vertical lines also indicate the date of the crisis (by the exchange market pressure index) 
and the date that adjustment began (devaluation or IMF program).    The average reserve loss, 
across countries, during the period of sudden stop, is 35 percent (computed relative to the peak, 
not logarithmically).   This does not count the reserves lost in the month of speculative attack, 
which we have identified as the month when the overall exchange market pressure index exceeds 
its threshold.    
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Figure 5.3. Russia Reserves Profile: 98M8 Crisis 
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Figure 5.4. Brazil Reserves Profile: 99M1 Crisis 
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics. 
 
Figure 5.5. Turkey Reserves Profile: 01M2 Crisis 
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Figure 6 shows the average experience, over the last 12 years, among 87 country crises.   
Here, each country’s reserves are expressed as a ratio to the level in the peak month, and the 
moving average is computed over three months. The peak of the average comes about 13 months 
before the crisis.    
 
Figure 6. Average Pre-Crisis Reserves Profile 
 Note: Reserves level is normalized against each country’s pre-crisis peak before averaging for all 
crises. 
 Source: IMF International Financial Statistics. 
 
Delaying adjustment.  One key question is whether delaying adjustment, after the 
sudden stop has begun, makes crises more severe, or more likely to happen at all.    The answer 
may well be “No,” since the correct economics is to “finance” a deficit---provided it is 
temporary---by drawing down reserves, rather than necessarily to “adjust.”   
 
 We could define the month when adjustment begins as the month of devaluation or of a 
substantial fiscal contraction, or as the month that an agreement on an IMF program is signed.   
But here we simply assume that adjustment begins at the same time as the crisis itself.   A 
relevant metric for measuring the length of delay is what percentage of reserves the country has 
lost by the time of the crisis, relative to the peak.   Does it affect the severity of the crisis?    
 
We regressed output loss in the year of a crisis against a number of our “crisis 
management” policy variables: change in maturity composition during the sudden stop period, a 
dummy representing whether the country signed an agreement with the IMF, and a measure of the 
mix of adjustment policies.   The fraction of reserves lost (during the interval from reserve peak 
to crisis) enters with the hypothesized positive sign, but is not significant at the 80 percent or 90 
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Shifting composition of debt during the sudden stop period. The exploration in 
previous sections of the importance of the composition of inward foreign investment, and the 
realization that the composition changes substantially over time, inspire us to consider a new 
hypothesis.  That is, that during the period of sudden stop, the authorities sometimes delay 
adjustment, not just by drawing down reserves, but also by shifting the composition of capital 
inflows toward short-term and dollar-denominated debt.  This strategy helps sustain the 
willingness of foreign residents to continue lending, in the short term, but magnifies the fragility 
of the economy rapidly over time.  In particular, the strategy worsens the balance sheet problems 
that have been identified in the literature as the major explanation for the severe losses in output 
that have followed recent crises (an identification that is consistent with our own results and 
beliefs).   Whatever the composition of the capital inflows a year or two earlier, if on the day 
when the crisis occurs the debt is substantially dollar-denominated and short-term, then the 
country is in trouble---regardless of what mix of policies it chooses as the means of adjustment.   
Either a short-term increase in interest rates or a devaluation, or any combination of the two, will 
sharply worsen the balance sheets of debtor firms and banks, and thereby contribute to 
bankruptcies and contraction in output and employment. 
 
A prime example is Mexico during the course of 1994.    International enthusiasm for 
investing in Mexico began to decline after the beginning of the year, due to some combination of 
the uprising in Chiapas, the assassination of presidential candidate Colosio, a new upward trend 
in U.S. interest rates, and the sexennial fiscal laxity of the Mexican election year.    The 
authorities clung to the exchange rate target and delayed adjustment, in the hopes circumstances 
would turn around.   Most obviously, during much of the year they ran down reserves.   But an 
important alternative mechanism of delay was to placate nervous investors by offering them 
tesobonos (short-term dollar linked bonds) in place of the peso bonds (Cetes) that they had 
previously held.   Between the first and second halves of the year, the share of foreign borrowing 
that was of maturity less than 1 year rose from 0.48 to 0.55 an increase of 7 percentage points.
41   
Figure 7a shows the dramatic increase in dollar-linked debt during the year leading up to the peso 
crisis of December 1994, and figure 7b shows the shift toward shorter maturities.   It seems likely 
that the magnitude of the Mexican recession in 1995 stemmed in part not just from the adverse 
balance sheet effects that have been so frequently noted since then, but particularly from the 
adverse shift in balance sheets that took place during the course of 1994. 
 
Figure 7a. Evolution of Mexican Debt According to Currency 
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Figure 7b. Evolution of Mexican Debt According to Maturity 
 
      Source: Mexican Ministry of Finance and Public Credit. 
 
Brazil may offer a more positive example: the exception that proves the rule.
42   Reserves 
peaked in May 1998.   Subsequently, contagion from the Russian devaluation and default leapt 
across the Atlantic to Brazil.    As in Mexico in 1994 (or Korea in 1997), Brazil faced an 
important presidential election toward the end of the year, which added to the authorities’ 
incentives to delay adjustment and to rely instead on hopes that capital inflows would resume on 
their own.   When Brazil was finally forced to devalue in January 1999, some observers predicted 
disaster, based on the analogies of recessions in Mexico in 1995 and East Asia in 1998.  Indeed, 
reserves had been run down to similarly low levels.    Yet Brazil suffered no output loss in 1999.  
What explains the difference?   The most common answer from knowledgeable participants and 
observers is that during the intervening eight months, the authorities had used their reserves to 
allow the private sector to hedge or unwind short-term dollar liabilities.
43   According to our data, 
the share of foreign borrowing that was short-term fell during the second half of the year from 
0.68 to 0.62 or by 6 percentage points.  By the end of the year, just before the devaluation, 
balance sheets were stronger, not weaker.
44 
 
  Is the shift toward dollar-denominated debt during the period of sudden stop a general 
phenomenon?   Many countries were never able to borrow much in domestic currency in the first 
place, so that there is little scope for shifting the composition to dollars.   But are there more 
Mexico’s than Brazil’s?  Unfortunately data on the currency composition of debt are not available 
at a sufficiently high frequency to do the test.   The “original sin” data on currency mismatch that 
we have been using are available only on an annual basis. 
 
It is more feasible to test the proposition that the composition shifts in an undesirable 
direction with respect to the maturity structure, than it is to test with respect to currency 
denomination. Data on the maturity of bank loans are available from the BIS on a quarterly basis 
for the period since 2000, and on a biannual basis before that.    Table 5 reports the change during 
the period of sudden stop for 74 crises.   On average, the fraction of loans that were short-term 
increased by 0.6 percentage points after the peak in reserves (over a period of one or two quarters, 
depending on data availability).    When we ran regressions of the subsequent output loss against 
our various crisis management policy measures, changes in maturity composition and the loss in 


























































































































































































%  long-term /(long-term +short-term ) - left axis Average m aturity in days - right axis 36 
 
Table 5.  Shift Toward Short-term Debt during Period of Sudden Stop, 74 Crises,  
1990—2002 
 
  Date of  ST/total in  ST/total in        Date of  ST/total in  ST/total 
in   
  reserve  quarter  comparison        reserve  quarter  comparis
on 
 
Crisis  peak  of crisis  quarter 
(a)  Change    Crisis  peak  of crisis  quarter 
(1)  Change 
ALG90M7  90M3  0.395  0.369  0.026    MAUR93M1  92M9  0.771  0.736  0.035 
ALG94M3  93M10  0.351  0.399  -0.048    MEX94M12  93M12  0.554  0.485  0.069 
ANG02M12  02M5  0.460  0.475  -0.016    MOLD98M11  97M10  0.543  0.438  0.106 
ANG99M5  97M10  0.491  0.499  -0.009    MYAN96M6  95M7  0.945  0.629  0.316 
AZER95M9  95M6  0.667  0.643  -0.024    NIC92M10  92M6  0.814  0.801  0.013 
BEL99M2  99M1  0.267  0.192  0.076    NIGA92M3  91M11  0.381  0.347  0.034 
BRAZ99M1  98M5  0.623  0.680  -0.057    NIGA99M1  98M5  0.550  0.531  0.019 
CAM93M4  93M3  0.482  0.431  0.052    NIGR94M1  92M11  0.407  0.500  -0.093 
CAM97M11  97M10  0.650  0.522  0.128    NIGR98M8  97M6  0.262  0.538  -0.277 
CHIN92M7  92M3  0.402  0.446  -0.043    PAK90M10  90M3  0.710  0.675  0.036 
CONG01M5  01M1  0.606  0.447  0.159    PAK96M10  96M3  0.488  0.658  -0.170 
CONG90M6  90M4  0.576  0.671  0.095    PAN97M6  97M5  0.439  0.416  -0.023 
CONG94M1  93M3  0.522  0.591  -0.069    ROM97M1  96M9  0.395  0.495  -0.100 
CONG97M8  97M6  0.372  0.380  0.008    RUSS98M8  98M4  0.476  0.470  0.006 
COT90M5  90M1  0.678  0.641  0.037    RWA90M11  90M10  0.667  0.706  -0.039 
COT93M11  93M4  0.797  0.830  -0.033    SEN93M11  93M11  0.843  0.876  -0.033 
DOM90M12  90M1  0.440  0.405  0.034    SOAF94M3  94M1  0.564  0.598  -0.034 
DOM94M8  93M10  0.530  0.523  0.007    SRI98M7  97M11  0.541  0.542  -0.001 
ECU92M5  92M1  0.518  0.475  0.044    SUD90M5  90M1  0.837  0.791  0.047 
ETH92M10  91M9  0.187  0.261  -0.074    TANZ97M7  97M3  0.864  0.777  0.087 
GAB01M9  01M1  0.593  0.622  -0.029    TOGO94M1  92M6  0.733  0.607  0.127 
GAB97M2  96M6  0.454  0.583  -0.130    TT92M1  91M3  0.301  0.292  0.008 
GHA00M7  00M2  0.613  0.552  0.061    TUN91M4  90M9  0.563  0.519  0.044 
GHA90M10  90M6  0.749  0.636  -0.114    TURK01M2  00M10  0.676  0.664  0.012 
GUI97M6  97M2  0.849  0.794  0.055    TURK94M3  93M8  0.626  0.554  0.073 
INDI91M4  90M3  0.297  0.305  -0.007    UAE95M9  95M7  0.920  0.886  0.034 
INDO98M1  97M6  0.626  0.628  -0.002    UGA90M5  90M4  0.861  0.785  0.076 
JAM91M9  91M2  0.374  0.379  -0.006    UKR98M9  97M9  0.489  0.427  0.062 
JOR91M8  91M7  0.414  0.456  -0.042    URG02M7  01M9  0.605  0.652  -0.047 
KEN94M11  94M7  0.619  0.597  0.022    VENZ02M2  00M11  0.341  0.387  -0.046 
KOR97M12  97M7  0.728  0.775  -0.047    VENZ94M5  93M9  0.297  0.315  -0.018 
LEB90M8  90M7  0.813  0.823  -0.010    ZAMB01M12  01M8  0.908  0.938  -0.030 
LIBR93M3  93M1  0.405  0.397  0.007    ZAMB91M4  90M12  0.654  0.661  -0.007 
LIBR96M12  96M10  0.362  0.396  -0.034    ZAMB94M11  94M11  0.542  0.577  -0.035 
LIBY02M1  01M12  0.966  0.952  -0.015    ZIMB90M11  90M11  0.715  0.574  0.141 
MALAW92M3  91M10  0.393  0.371  0.022    ZIMB97M9  96M8  0.740  0.753  -0.013 
AVERAGE ACROSS 
CRISES                  0.006 
Note: 
a.  Quarter of preceding reserve peak is used in comparison to crisis quarter.  In cases where reserve peak 
and crisis fall in same quarter, that quarter is compared against the following quarter if crisis and/or reserve 
peak fall in June or December.  If crisis and/or reserve peak fall in any other month, that quarter is 
compared against the preceding quarter.  Data are available from BIS in semi-annual frequency (Q2 and 
Q4).  In cases where reserve peak or crisis fall in Q1 or Q3, the preceding quarter' s data are used.  For data 
after 2000, quarterly data is available.  If crisis or reserve peak falls in first month of quarter, the preceding 
quarter' s data are used; otherwise, that quarter' s data are used. 
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators; IMF World Economic Outlook and International 
Financial Statistics. 
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Going to the IMF. Whether IMF programs help or hurt, relative to the relevant 
alternative, is an important and controversial question.  Of course one does not necessarily want 
to blame the surgeon because his patients die more often than do the chiropractor’s; the former is 
likely to get the more serious cases.   Even those studies that have tried to do a careful job of 
constructing the relevant counterfactual have had a difficult time of it.
 45   One of the problems for 
statistical differentiation is that so few countries choose the Malaysian option of not going to the 
Fund.  But, for what it is worth, we looked for a statistical relationship between a country’s 
signing a program with the IMF and the magnitude of the output loss in the year of the crisis.    
We found no relationship, whether conditioning on other policy variables or not.   (We tried 
counting only countries that had gone to the Fund within a 6-month period, or within a 12-month 
period.)    
 
The Mix: Spending Contraction versus Devaluation  
 
Perhaps the most interesting question of crisis management is the question of the mix 
between adjustment by real devaluation versus expenditure reduction–assuming a fixed quantity 
of adjustment given by the balance of payments constraint.    When we think of expenditure 
reduction as fiscal policy, our measure is the change in the budget relative to the increase in the 
trade balance.    We found that countries where the fall in government consumption constituted a 
large share of the adjustment in the trade balance suffered a smaller output loss, other things 
being equal.  The effect, however, was not generally significant at the 95 percent level. 
 
When we think of expenditure reduction as monetary policy, our measure of the mix is 
the increase in the real interest rate relative to the increase in the real exchange rate.  We found 
that countries that relied heavily on high interest real rates (either absolutely or relatively to the 
preceding year) suffered larger output losses than those that relied on big real depreciation of the 
currency.   The difference was very significant statistically, as reported in table 6.  
 
















      Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
It is useful to note that the regressions reported here do not include initial economy-wide 
corporate or bank balance sheet information due to lack of data.  Those economies that started 
with a more serious currency-mismatch in their balance sheets before the crisis could fare less 
well with a depreciation approach as a crisis management tool.  
 
Regressions with Robust Standard Errors Number of obs= 7
F(  4, 2)= 12.48
Prob > F 0.0756
R-squared 0.9244
Root MSE 0.90388
------------- ----------- ------------ -------- -------- ------------- ------------
Robust
outputloss Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Con f. Interval]
------------- ----------- ------------ -------- -------- ------------- ------------
resloss 1.140357 1.176052 0.97 0.435 -3.919787 6.2005
composition 2.050635 3.989811 0.51 0.658 -15.11614 19.21741
imf6m -0.6449699 0.8878959 -0.73 0.543 -4.465278 3.175338
rmindelrer 1.166299 0.190995 6.11 0.026 0.344514 1.988085
_cons 0.0068248 0.270099 0.03 0.982 -1.155317 1.168967
------------- ----------- ------------ -------- -------- ------------- ------------   38 
Summary of Conclusions 
 
Our results are consistent with much of the previous empirical literature in that we do not 
find that crises are necessarily the outcome of high current account deficits or high indebtedness 
per se, nor even of domestic credit creation.     Nor does exchange rate flexibility necessarily 
mean that crises will be avoided.  There is stronger evidence that poor institutional quality 
(corruption) is a fundamental problem.  
       
But some of the new conventional wisdoms do not appear to be borne out by our tests.   
The corner exchange rate regimes are, if anything, more prone to serious crises, not less.   If 
emerging market countries liberalize their capital controls, they are less prone to crises, not more.    
An extensive search for interactive effects that have been claimed by others does not uncover 
much evidence that capital account openness is particularly dangerous in combination with low 
income, expansionary policies, or corruption.  
  
Countries are likely to have more frequent and more severe crises if their capital inflows 
are tilted toward short-term dollar borrowing and away from FDI and equity inflows, and if they 
hold a low level of reserves.   The ratio of short-term debt to reserves is a particularly important 
indicator.  We find evidence with the regression tree technique that high levels of inflation 
significantly raise the probability of crisis when coming in combination with a low level of 
reserves and a composition of capital inflow that is tilted to the short-term. 
 
This chapter has sought to draw greater attention to policy decisions that are made during 
the phase when capital inflows come to a sudden stop.    All of the theoretical literature, and most 
of the empirical literature, treats the “sudden stop” phase as taking place in a single instant: the 
country goes directly from a period of capital inflows and strong reserves to a crisis of capital 
outflows and plunging reserves.  In reality there is often an interim period, when international 
investors have begun to lose enthusiasm, but the crisis has not yet hit.  Think of the lag between 
the beginning of 1994, when investors began to pull out of Mexico, and the December peso crisis.   
(It does not matter for our purposes why investors pulled out, whether it was U.S. interest rates, 
domestic instability, election year macroeconomics, or even investor fickleness.)   We find, 
across a broad sample of developing countries (1990--2002), that the typical lag between the peak 
in reserves and a currency crisis was six months to a year, depending on the calculation.  The 
average loss in reserves during the sudden stop phase was 35 percent.   Some countries had lost 
almost all of their reserves by the time they decided to abandon the exchange rate target.    
 
Procrastination---the period of “financing a balance of payments deficit rather than 
adjusting”--had serious consequences in some cases.   Typically, by the time the crisis hit, the 
level of reserves was so low that confidence could not be restored without beginning to rebuild 
them.  As a result, reserves could not play their designated role of cushioning the contraction.  In 
addition, the composition of liabilities tended to shift adversely during the period of sudden stop. 
 
In the example of Mexico during the course of 1994, when the authorities were not 
stalling for time by running down reserves, they were instead placating nervous investors by 
offering them tesobonos (short-term dollar linked bonds) in place of the peso bonds (Cetes) that 
they had previously held.  We find that on average across country crises, the fraction of loans that 
were short-term increased by 0.6 percentage points after the peak in reserves (over a period of 
one or two quarters, depending on data availability).    
 
Others have correctly pointed out that crises are more frequent and more severe when 
short-term borrowing is high, dollar denomination is high, FDI is low, and reserves are low---in  39 
large part because balance sheets are then very sensitive to increases in exchange rates and short-
term interest rates.  Our point is that these compositional measures are strongly affected by 
decisions made by policymakers in the period immediately after capital inflows have begun to 
dry up but before the speculative attack itself has hit.   These crisis management policies merit 
more attention.   If countries that are faced with a fall in inflows had adjusted more promptly, 
rather than stalling for time by running down reserves or shifting to loans that are shorter-termed 
and dollar-denominated, they might be able to adjust on more attractive terms. 
 
Our conclusions can be succinctly summarized in ten points. 
 
1.  There is as yet no clear evidence of a general tendency for the removal of capital controls to 
be harmful.  If anything, in our results, financial liberalization appears to reduce crises. 
 
2.  There is also no evidence in favor of the conventional wisdom of the corners hypothesis: that 
the superior exchange rate regimes are hard pegs and floating. .   If anything, in our results, 
intermediate regimes seem to do better. 
 
3.  Our results regarding corruption are consistent with the trend in recentemphasis on issues of 
governance, the rule of law, and institutions, as key determinants of economic performance in 
developing countries. Indonesia is an example where corruption must be listed as an 
important contributing cause of the crisis. 
 
4.  Our probit model found inflation to be an important predictor of currency crises, as in the first 
generation models of speculative attack.   But inflation is endogenous, and we did not have 
any success tracing the problem back to domestic credit creation.  We had slightly more 
success in identifying high budget deficits as a root cause, as in Brazil and Turkey. 
 
5.  Consistent with earlier research, the level of current account deficits or debt is not as useful a 
predictor as the composition of capital inflows.   If inflows take the form of short-term dollar-
denominated debt, they are more likely to lead to trouble.  If the flows take the form of 
foreign direct investment or equity, crises are less likely.   These composition variables are 
relevant not just for the probability of crisis, but also the severity.    As the balance sheet 
literature points out, a country that suffers from maturity and currency mismatch is likely to 
experience bankruptcies and sharp contraction when a crisis comes. 
 
6.  The level of reserves plays a key role as well, as in all three generations of models of 
speculative attacks.   The ratio of short-term debt to reserves is a particularly useful indicator.    
High levels of reserves helped China, Taiwan, Province of China, and Hong Kong SAR ride 
out the 1997--98 crises, and the otherwise puzzling propensity of these economies to continue 
running up ever-higher levels of reserves subsequently makes some sense in this light. 
 
7.  This study has sought to draw added attention to some aspects of the management of crises, 
particularly policy during the period that begins when capital flows turn around and reserves 
peak and that ends with the outright speculative attack and devaluation (or, in the case of a 
successfully defended hard peg, that ends with a discrete large loss of reserves).   Across the 
average of the sample, this period lasts 6 to 13 months, depending on the method of 
estimation.  In other words, the “sudden stop” typically lasts for the better part of a year; it is 
not the same as the speculative attack.  Our claim is that delaying adjustment during this 
sudden stop period can have severe consequences when the attack finally comes, even when 
the shock appears to be temporary---and thus to merit financing under the usual textbook 
rules.   40 
 
8.  The significance of indicators such as reserves and the composition of debt may lie less in 
long-term tendencies that vary across countries than as key aspects of crisis management that 
vary over time within the same country Mexico in 1994 and Thailand and Korea in 1997 had 
run down the level of reserves sharply by the time they went to the IMF and began 
adjustment programs.   In the months leading up to the Mexican attack, the composition of 
the debt had shifted from peso-denominated to dollar-linked, and from longer-term to shorter.    
These were decisions by the policymakers to delay adjustment.   The pattern is typical. 
 
9.  We were unable to find evidence of a significant relationship between the severity of crises 
and whether the country had an IMF program or whether adjustment took the form of 
devaluation rather than fiscal contraction. 
 
10. It is instructive to combine the balance sheet effects---wherein a country that enters a crisis 
with short-term dollar-denominated debt is likely to suffer a more severe crisis---with the 
tendency of countries to experience an adverse shift in composition during the period of 
sudden stop, as captured by an increase in the ratio of short-term debt to reserves.   The 
implication is that it is precisely the decision to delay adjustment that leaves crisis victims 
with few good options, because balance sheets have deteriorated in the meantime.    It is 
possible that, at this point, no combination of expenditure-reduction and expenditure-
switching policies will, without a recession, satisfy the new external financing constraint. 
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Deep Determinants from the Growth Literature  
 
Recent research recognizes that macroeconomic and trade policies, although important 
influences on economic performance, may themselves reflect deeper determinants.   The growth 
literature now emphasizes three big influences: openness to trade,
46 tropical geography,
47 and 
especially, the quality of a country’s institutions, such as protection of property rights, efficacy of 
the legal system, and absence of corruption.
48  Financial market institutions, such as protection of 
shareholder rights and the quality of regulation, receive particular emphasis.
49   When a country is 
considered corrupt, foreign investors are skittish, for example.
50   
 
This research ties in with some current trends in the practice of aid and development 
policy in Washington.  The current trend is to say, not that such policies as macroeconomic 
discipline and openness are unimportant, but that countries cannot be artificially forced from the 
outside to agree to such policies, as under typical IMF or World Bank programs.   Instead the 
country needs to “take ownership” of the reforms.   If the political economy dictates transfers 
from rural farmers to urban workers, or if a federalist constitution gives provinces claim to 
income tax revenue, an agreement on paper with the IMF or World Bank to devalue the currency 
or reduce the budget deficit may be doomed to fail.  This is the argument of a recent paper by 
Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Thaichaeron (2003). They find econometrically that 
institutions offer more explanatory power than policies.  They also use the case study of Ghana to 
illustrate how an IMF-encouraged devaluation, with the aim of raising the real price of traded 
goods such as cocoa, can soon be offset by the governing elite, for example because the cocoa 
marketing board controls the price paid to the small inland farmers for cocoa. 
 
Choice of Exchange Rate Regime 
 
One major question remains what currency regime a country should choose: a fixed 
exchange rate, a floating exchange rate, or a regime with an intermediate degree of flexibility, 
such as a managed float, target zone, crawl, or adjustable peg.  The debate is an old one, but it 
acquired some new features in the late 1990s.
51   
 
One new development has been the decision of some countries to abandon their 
independent currency for a device to fix its value firmly, such as a currency board
52 or 
dollarization.
53    The motivation, to promote credibility, was similar to the motivation of those 
who had based stabilization programs on exchange targets in the preceding decade, but the logic 




One of the arguments for a firm fix was that it would force domestic institutions to evolve 
in a favorable way, and would help prevent the chronic monetization of fiscal deficits that had 
undone so many previous attempts at macroeconomic stabilization.
55   Argentina’s currency 
board, for example, appeared to work very well during most of the decade.   It was believed that 
this “convertibility plan” had also encouraged reforms that by the late 1990s had turned 
Argentina’s banking system into one of the best among all emerging markets.
56   But when the 
crisis came in 2001, neither the supposedly deep pockets of foreign parents that had been allowed 
local bank subsidiaries, nor any of the country’s other innovative reforms, was able to protect its  42 
banking system.  This outcome cannot but have had a dampening effect on international 
enthusiasm for currency boards. 
57 
 
  Another new argument for monetary union has been empirical findings by Andrew Rose 
and co-authors that the boost to bilateral trade is significant, and larger than had been previously 
assumed, as large as a threefold increase.
58   While many others have advanced critiques of the 
Rose research, the basic finding has withstood perturbations and replications remarkably well, 
even if the estimated magnitudes are sometimes smaller.
59    Most Central and Eastern Europeans 
now aspire to join the European Monetary Union.  Some developing countries seeking enhanced 




  There are plenty of advantages to floating exchange rates as well, and most of the victims 
of crises in emerging markets over the last eight years have responded by increasing flexibility.    
One advantage that is beginning to receive renewed emphasis is that floaters are partially 
insulated against fluctuations in the world market for their exports.
61 
 
Another new proposition of the 1990s was that countries are, or should be, moving away 
from the intermediate regimes, in favor of one corner or another (hard peg or float).
62       Also 
relatively new is the realization that attempts in practice to categorize countries’ choice of regime 
(into fixed, floating, and intermediate) differ from the official categorization.
63   Countries that 
say they are floating, for example, often in reality are not.
64  Countries that say they are fixing 
often in reality are not.
65   Indeed neat categorization may not be possible at all.    While there are 
by now a number of attempts at de facto classification, the answers they yield show a surprisingly 
low correlation, not only with the de jure classification, but also with one another.  This is 
probably the major reason why different attempts to measure economic performance by exchange 
rate regime give different answers.
66 
 
That Argentina was in the end forced to abandon its currency board, in 2001, also 
dramatizes the lesson that the choice of exchange rate regime, including even the supposedly firm 
institutional fixes, is not so permanent or deep as had previously been thought.
67  Even full 
monetary union need not be a truly permanent choice, as the Czech-Slovak divorce illustrated. 
The choice of exchange rate regime is more likely endogenous with respect to institutions, rather 
than the other way around.
68    Furthermore, it may even be desirable that exchange rate regimes 
change along with circumstances.    It has long been recognized, in the optimum currency area 
literature, that a single exchange rate regime does not suit all countries.   (Fixed rates are more 
suitable for countries that are small and open to trade, for example.)   It may also be true that, 
even for a given country, a single regime does not necessarily suit it at all points in its history.    
Criteria such as patterns of trade themselves evolve over time. 
 
By now, all regimes–institutional fix, float, and intermediate regimes–have proven 
themselves to be something of a mirage.
69   That is, when a country officially opts for one regime, 
first of all, it may not in fact be following it. Second, it may be impossible to verify quickly what 
regime it is indeed following. Third, different attempts at de facto classification may give 
different answers. Finally, the regime may change in the subsequent year.
70    It may be more 
useful to think of what percentage of the time countries spend at various ends of the spectrum, 
rather than treating each new regime choice as a long-lasting one.  The “corners hypothesis” is 
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  The literature on capital controls and capital account liberalization is also very large.
72 
 
Review of arguments on efficiency of financial markets. Financial integration between 
an emerging market country and the rest of the world has many advantages.   Some of the 
potential gains from international trade in financial assets are analogous to the gains from 
international trade in goods.      First, for a successfully developing country–that is, one that has 
not just a low capital labor ratio but also sound fundamentals---the rate of return to domestic 
capital is sufficiently high that investment can be financed more cheaply by borrowing from 
abroad than out of domestic saving alone.  Second, investors in richer countries can earn a higher 
rate of return on their savings by investing in the emerging market than they could domestically.  
Third, everyone benefits from the opportunity to diversify away risks and smooth disturbances.  
Fourth, letting foreign financial institutions into the country can improve the efficiency of 
domestic financial markets.  Over-regulated and potentially inefficient domestic institutions are 
subject to the harsh discipline of competition and the demonstration effect of having examples to 
emulate.  At the same time, governments face the discipline of the international capital markets in 
the event they make policy mistakes (for example, in their domestic regulatory duties).   The 
capital account liberalization can be a useful signal of commitment to market reform.
73 
 
Recent crises, however, suggest that financial markets do not always work quite as 
perfectly as the happy view of the economic theorist suggests.  It is difficult to argue that 
investors have punished countries when and only when the governments are following bad 
policies.  First, large inflows often give way suddenly to large outflows, with little news 
appearing in between that might explain the change in sentiment.  Second, contagion sometimes 
spreads to countries where fundamentals appear strong.  Third, the recessions that have hit 
emerging market countries have been of such magnitude that it is difficult to argue that the 
system is working well.  Beyond the specific issue of crises in emerging markets, international 
capital inflows do not appear to increase during temporary downturns nor fall during booms, as 
the smoothing theory says they should. 
 
Evidence on liberalization. Do the advantages of open financial markets outweigh the 
disadvantages?   Peter Henry and Anusha Chari, for example, have shown that when countries 
open up their stock markets, the cost of capital facing domestic firms falls (stock prices rise), with 
a positive effect on their investment and on economic growth.
74    Some researchers, such as 
Reuven Glick and Michael Hutchison (2002), have found that countries that liberalize restrictions 
on capital flows are less prone to speculative attacks.   But the evidence is mixed.
75 
 
  Capital account liberalization has often been implicated in the crises experienced by 
emerging markets over the last ten years.    Certainly a country that does not borrow from abroad 
in the first place cannot have an international debt crisis.   It has been widely alleged that 
developing countries in Asia and elsewhere were pressured to liberalize their financial markets 
prematurely, in the interest of U.S. banks but to the detriment of the countries.
76 
 
Either a blanket indictment or a blanket vindication of capital controls would be too 
simplistic.  One important point is that capital account liberalization may be good under some 
conditions and in some countries, and bad in other circumstances, much as is the case with the 
choice of exchange rate regime.   A second important point is that both the proponents of controls 
and their opponents tend indiscriminately to lump together Chile-style controls on inflows, 
Malaysia-style control on outflows, a Tobin tax on all foreign exchange transactions,
77 and other 
kinds of taxes and restrictions.  But the precise nature of the restrictions matters a lot. Each of 
these two points is considered in turn below.  44 
 
Some of the most interesting research examines under what circumstances capital 
account liberalization is more likely to be good or bad for economic performance.   One claim is 
that only for rich countries does financial opening lower volatility
78 and raise growth;
79 capital 
account liberalization is more likely to lead to market crashes in lower-income countries.
80    A 
second claim is that capital account liberalization raises growth only in the absence of 
macroeconomic imbalances, such as overly expansionary monetary and fiscal policy.
81   A third 
important finding is that institutions such as shareholder protection and accounting standards 
determine whether liberalization leads to development of the financial sector,
82 and in turn to 
long-run growth.
83    A related finding is that corruption tilts the composition of capital inflows 
toward the form of banking flows, and toward dollar denomination, both of which have been 
associated with crises.
84   The implication is that capital account liberalization can help if 
institutions are strong and other fundamentals are favorable, but can hurt if they are not.  
 
All these findings are consistent with a conventional lesson regarding the sequencing of 
reforms: that countries will do better in the development process if they postpone opening of the 
capital account until after other institutional reforms.
85   Of course, the observed positive 
correlation between the opening of capital markets and growth could be attributable to reverse 
causation–rich countries liberalize as a result of having developed, not as a cause.  Hali Edison 
and colleagues (2002) conclude from their own tests that this is not the case. 
 
Malaysia-style restrictions, and other controls on outflows. Controls on capital outflows 
have been common in the past.  This alternative is often proposed by those who observe that 
modern financial markets do not seem to work as smoothly as the theory predicts.  Many 
developing countries–most importantly, China and India–had not made much progress at 
removing them by 1997.   When the East Asia crisis hit, many in these countries felt vindicated.    
 
Reimposing capital controls that had earlier been removed is one policy option for coping 
with a crisis, though not likely to be sanctioned by the IMF.   The goal is often to allow a lower 
domestic interest, and sustain growth, without accelerating a capital outflow that would threaten 
the currency.   One disadvantage is that reimposed controls may not be very effective.  Once 
markets have developed and have become familiar with derivatives and offshore banks, it may be 
difficult to turn the clock back, and attempts to do so are likely to have negative repercussions in 
a democratic society.   Malaysia adopted controls to prevent investors from taking money 
offshore in 1998.  Tight administrative control made this strategy more effective than it might 
have been in a more open society.  Dani Rodrik and Ethan Kaplan (2002) find evidence that 
Malaysia’s decision to impose controls on outflows in 1998 helped it weather the Asia crisis. 
 
Even when such controls are enforceable, a second disadvantage is that controls on 
outflows can weaken the discipline that international financial markets place on the quality of 
macroeconomic policy.  Governments have all too often used controls to shield themselves 
temporarily from the implications of bad policies.
86   A third disadvantage is that they are likely 
to scare investors away from the country in the future.    
 
Chile-style penalties, and other controls on inflows. The usual motivation for controls 
on inflows is to prevent overvaluation and overindebtedness, and thereby prevent a crisis from 
occurring in the first place.  The enforcement problem is not as great as with outflows: it is easier 
to keep capital out than to keep it in.  Some countries appear to have had some success 
discouraging inflow, so as to limit real appreciation and aggregate debt.   At times in the early 
1990s, Chile, Colombia, Thailand, and Malaysia each imposed controls to discourage capital 
inflows.     45 
 
The clearest disadvantage to controls on capital inflows is that the country passes up an 
opportunity to finance its development by borrowing abroad at a relatively lower interest rate.  
Instead, it has to finance investment out of higher-cost domestic funds.  Controls designed to 
moderate capital inflows may impact small firms, in particular.
87   
 
Chile’s controls have attracted the most attention, in part because they had the effect (if 
not the intention) of shifting the composition of capital inflows away from the short end of the 
maturity spectrum, and in part because Chile’s overall economic record has been so successful.   
As Sebastian Edwards (1999, 2000) has pointed out, the reforms undertaken by Chile were far too 
numerous and varied to allow one to attribute its overall economic performance specifically to 
those controls in place during the 1990s.
88   But there is a more persuasive argument related to the 
composition of capital inflows. 
 
 This study emphasizes that the composition of inflow is statistically a leading indicator 
of the probability that severe currency crashes will occur. The higher the reliance on foreign-
currency borrowing that is short-term or intermediated through banks, the higher the probability 
of crisis.   Although statistical correlation need not imply causality, this conclusion is consistent 
with proposals for controls that would seek to change the composition of capital inflows, as 
opposed to the total magnitude.  Taxes or restrictions on short-term inflows may shift the 
composition toward longer maturities.   
 
Chile imposed its famous tax on inflows in 1991.  It took the form of a requirement that a 
percentage of any foreign borrowing be left in a non-interest bearing deposit maintained at the 
central bank for up to one year.   In addition, there was a longstanding requirement that all FDI 
stay in the country for at least one year.  These controls apparently succeeded in changing the 
composition of the capital inflow to Chile in the 1990s, in the direction of longer-term maturities, 
even if having little effect on the total magnitude.
89   
 
Some countries aim their restrictions specifically at banks. High reserve requirements on 
banks’ foreign borrowing fall well within the kind of enhanced prudential banking regulation that 
is widely recommended for emerging markets.     
 
Chile removed its inflow penalties at the end of the decade.    Some commentators saw 
this as a rejection of the usefulness of controls, or at least as confirmation that liberalization is 
appropriate as a country reaches a certain stage of development.   But this move came during a 
period of capital drought for developing countries worldwide.    
 
An alternative to the view that the immediate goal should be permanent liberalization 
deserves more consideration.   That alternative is the view that Chile-style controls will remain as 
one possibly useful tool to be applied during a particular stage of the cycle.   If one closes the 
umbrella when it stops raining, that does not mean one has changed one’s mind about the 
usefulness of umbrellas.   Controls may have a role to play as a temporary measure when a 
country faces a large upsurge of inflows.  They might help a government “play for time” until it 
can determine whether the funds are going to useful investments, which will generate the foreign 
exchange earnings needed in the future to service the debt, or whether they are instead going, for 
example, to consumption.  After several years, policymakers may have a better idea whether their 
country is the next tiger, justifying the inflows, or merely the subject of a speculative bubble. 
90 
 
Choice of Trade Openness 
  46 
  The case in favor of free trade in goods and services is generally considered more certain 
than the case in favor of free trade in assets, at least when it comes to the average rate of growth.   
There is no necessary reason why openness to trade need to reduce the volatility of real income, 
however.   Indeed, for a country facing high variability in its terms of trade on world markets, it is 
entirely possible that higher levels of openness lead to larger cyclical swings.   On the other hand, 
it has been observed that countries with a high ratio of trade to GDP, such as the East Asian 
tigers, tend to have an easier time adjusting to sudden stops, while those with a low ratio, like 
Argentina and other Latin American countries, tend to have a harder time.   
 
  One interpretation is that a higher ratio of trade to GDP (for a given debt/GDP ratio) 
means that in the aftermath of a cut-off of capital inflow of a given size, a smaller percentage 
increase in the output of traded goods is required to fill the gap (which in turn calls for a smaller 
devaluation or contraction in output).   Another interpretation is that for countries that are highly 
dependent on trade, a cut-off of trade credit would be very costly.  If the threatened loss of trade 
is the answer to the question why troubled debtors tend to pay their debts,
91 and thus the 
explanation as to why creditors are willing to lend to them, then a higher ratio of trade is a form 
of “giving hostages” that makes a cut off of lending less likely.
92   The implication is that 
openness to trade and openness to capital together is a good combination (analogously to the 
optimum currency area conclusion that openness to trade suits a country for a fixed exchange 
rate). 
 
Composition and Use of Capital Inflows 
 
As noted above, indicators that concern the composition of capital inflow, rather than the 
total amount, appear to be statistically useful at predicting the probability of currency crashes.   
 
Bank loans versus other modes of finance. Banks, in particular, have been implicated in 
most crises.
93  Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is a less risky source of capital inflow than bank 
loans.
94  The same is true of equity flows.
95   FDI is thought to be relatively more stable.  One 
theory is that bank flows, in particular, are more vulnerable to moral hazard problems created by 
the prospect of government bailouts than are other modes of finance.    Another theory is that 
equities and FDI allow more efficient risk-sharing: in the event of adverse developments, the 
price of the asset falls automatically, without the need for the costly and protracted negotiations 
and restructuring of bank loans or bonds.   Indexation of debt to variables such as the commodity 
export price would accomplish much of the same purpose, but for some reason this is rarely done. 
 
The fraction of capital inflow that is short-term (the problem of maturity mismatch). 
Countries that borrow funds short-term are more likely to get into trouble, especially if those 
funds are intermediated through the banking system and denominated in dollars or other foreign 
currencies.   Countries that borrow long-term are less likely to get into trouble, especially if the 
inflow takes the form of foreign direct investment rather than bank loans.  A mismatch of short-
term bank liabilities with longer-term bank assets (such as real estate) leaves a country 
vulnerable.     One possibility is that a run-up of short-term bank credit is a symptom of coming 
problems, rather than the fundamental cause, much as an individual who tries to charge his 
mortgage payments on his credit card reveals that he is overextended.   Either way, a 
concentration of short-term debt, especially relative to reserves, is a danger signal.
96 
 
The fraction of debt that is dollar-denominated (the problem of currency mismatch). 
One prime culprit in explaining the apparent curse that follows developing countries in 
international financial markets is their inability to borrow internationally in their own currency. 
Ricardo Hausmann has called the problem   “original sin,” by which he means that it is the  47 
fundamental root of the problem.  If countries incur foreign liabilities despite the inability to 
borrow in their own currency---that is, if they borrow in foreign currency on net---that is the 
problem of “currency mismatch.”
 97    
   
We are not interested solely in predicting whether or not a crisis will occur.   Another 
important question is why were the crises so severe---inflicting recession and bankruptcy on much 
of the economy---once they occurred.   The composition of capital inflows is also relevant for the 
magnitude of output loss if there is a crisis.   Firms or banks that incur liabilities in dollars (or 
other foreign currencies) while their revenues are primarily in domestic currency face the 
problem of currency mismatch.  This, in turn, can lead to insolvency and contraction when the 
domestic currency devalues sharply.
98     If most of the debt is denominated in dollars or other 
foreign currencies, as is the case for most developing countries, then a devaluation can be 
contractionary, as the adverse balance sheet effect renders otherwise-solvent debtor corporations 
and banks insolvent, and leads to plant closings and recession.  These balance sheet effects are at 
the center of many analyses of why emerging markets seem prone to severe crises.
99      (The 
balance sheet effect is only one of many ways in which devaluation can be contractionary.)
100    
 
Reserves. The view that countries do not need reserves, because they can borrow them, 
has been thoroughly discredited.   Reserves are important precisely because, in the event of a 
sudden stop, countries cannot borrow, at least not at regular world interest rates.   And it may be 
that floating countries need reserves, not just countries with exchange rate targets as standard 
models imply. 
 
Countries that accumulate a high level of international reserves are less likely to have 
problems.    How high a level of reserves is enough?  The traditional rule of thumb was phrased 
in terms of trade: a country needs a minimum level of reserves that is enough to pay for three 
months of imports.  As the source of balance of payments crises has shifted from the trade 
account to the capital account, a new rule of thumb has been proposed, attributed to Pablo 
Guidotti (2003): a country need to have enough reserves so that it could cover all debt coming 
due over the next year (short-term debt, as well as maturing longer-term debt), in the event that 
creditors suddenly lose willingness to roll it over or extend new loans.  As already noted, one of 
the most useful summary indicators of danger is the ratio of short-term debt to reserves.   The 
Guidotti rule says that as this ratio rises above 1, the danger of a crisis rises with it. 48 
APPENDIX B.  THE INTERNAL/EXTERNAL BALANCE FRAMEWORK WHEN DEVALUATION IS 
CONTRACTIONARY 
 
In the traditional framework, there are two classes of policy instruments: expenditure-
reducing policies, such as monetary contraction; and expenditure-switching policies, such as 
devaluation.  The pair matches up nicely with the existence of two policy targets: internal balance 
and external balance.   
 
Consider a graphical representation with the interest rate and exchange rate (price of 
foreign currency) on the axes.  To satisfy external balance, there is an inverse tradeoff between 
the two instruments.  A devaluation and an increase in the interest rate are each ways of 
improving the trade balance---the latter by reducing expenditure Thus the more you have of one, 
the less you need of the other.  (If external balance is defined as equilibrium in the overall balance 
of payments, including the capital account along with the trade balance, the relationship is still 
downward-sloping, since a devaluation and an increase in the interest rate are both ways of 
making domestic assets more attractive to global investors.)   
 
To satisfy internal balance, the tradeoff is traditionally considered to be upward-sloping.  
An increase in the interest rate reduces the domestic demand for domestic goods, while a 
devaluation increases the net foreign demand for domestic goods; if you have more of one, you 
also need more of the other, to prevent excess supply or excess demand for domestic goods.  The 
existence of two independent instruments implies the possibility of attaining both targets 
simultaneously, at the intersection of the internal and external balance schedule.  In the aftermath 
of an adverse shock in the foreign sector, for example, the right new combination of devaluation 
and monetary contraction will restore balance of payments equilibrium while maintaining real 
economic growth (as illustrated in figure B-1). 
 
Figure B-1.  Attaining Internal and External Balance: Traditional Version 
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Source: Authors’ calculations.  49 
This is not the way things actually work.
1  By now we have had enough 
experience with crises in emerging markets that the traditional framework needs to be 
modified.  The simple generalization seems to be that most developing countries that are 
hit by financial crises go into recession.  The reduction in income is the only way of 
quickly generating the improvement in the trade balance that is the necessary counterpart 
to the increased reluctance of international investors to lend.  External balance is a 
jealous mistress that can be satisfied only if internal balance is left to go wanting. 
 
Some critics of the IMF say that the recessions are the result of Fund policies, specifically 
the insistence on monetary contraction.  The argument is that the mix of a lower interest rate 
combined with a devaluation would successfully maintain internal balance.  They often make the 
point that high interest rates are not in practice especially attractive to foreign investors when they 
carry increased probability of default (and associated recession).  This is true.  But in our view, it 
is not the most important correction in the traditional framework.  Even if interest rates do not 
have as big a positive effect on the capital account as earlier models of high financial integration 
suggested---so that the graphical relationship may be flatter---we believe that the sign of the 
effect is still the same.  One cannot normally attract many investors by lowering interest rates.  
Therefore the external balance line still slopes downward.  Claims that high rates are damaging to 
the real economy willfully ignore the lack of an alternative, if the external balance constraint is to 
be met. 
 
Where the traditional framework needs most to be modified is the relationship giving 
internal balance---not external balance.  By now the evidence seems strong that devaluation is 
contractionary, at least in the first year, and perhaps in the second as well.  We have long been 
aware of various potential contractionary effects of devaluation in developing countries.   A total 
of ten such effects are identified in textbooks,
2 of which the difficulty of servicing dollar debts 
has turned out to be by far the most important in recent crises (the balance sheet effect).  But a 
mainstream view has been that any negative effects from a devaluation were eventually offset by 
the positive effect of stimulus to net exports, so that by the second year, when the latter had 
gathered strength, the overall effect on output had turned positive.
3  Now however, one must 
judge the negative effects stronger than had been thought, and the positive effects weaker.   
Imports fall sharply; indeed crisis-impacted countries have for this reason experienced sharp 
increases in their trade balances beginning as soon as two or three months after the crisis.   But 
this is clearly a response to the unavailability of finance and collapse of income and spending, not 
to relative prices.  In other words, it is expenditure-reduction, not expenditure switching. 
 
If devaluation is contractionary, then the internal balance line slopes down, not up (as 
illustrated in figure B-2).  Moreover the slope is disturbingly similar to the slope of the external 
balance line.  It is hard to see where the two intersect, if indeed they intersect at all.  This means 
that it is hard to see what combination of policy instruments, if any, can simultaneously satisfy 
both internal and external balance, after an adverse shock has shifted the latter outward.  The 
depressing conclusion is that there is no escape from recession.  All policy instruments work 
through reduction in income in the short run: devaluation, fiscal contraction, and monetary 
                                                 
1 Krugman (1998b). 
 
2 Caves, Frankel, and Jones (2002).   For further exposition, see Corden (1993).  
3Edwards (1986) and Kamin (1988).   50 
contraction.  Even structural policy reform, such as insisting that bad banks go under, is likely to 
have a negative effect on economic activity in the short run. 
 
Figure B-2. Attaining Internal and External Balance: When Devaluation is Contractionary 
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Is the financing-versus-adjustment framework then no longer useful?  The framework 
may still be relevant during the (relatively brief) period after a terms-of-trade or other shock 
arises, but before the financial or currency crisis hits. It is hard to identify and date the former, 
even with the benefit of hindsight.  But consider the interval of one to two years preceding 
December 2001 in Argentina, preceding July 1997 in East Asia, preceding December 1994 in 
Mexico, and preceding July 1982 in Latin America.  In each case, policymakers responded to 
deterioration in their trade or capital accounts by running down foreign exchange reserves or 
shifting to short-term borrowing.  They succeeded in this way in postponing macroeconomic 
adjustment and in postponing crisis.  But when the crisis came, it was that much worse, requiring 
at that point the unfortunate response of turning all dials to contractionary settings---as the only 
way of satisfying the constraints imposed by finicky international investors.   
 
It would have been better in these cases if the countries had spent these short intervals 
adjusting rather than financing, at a time when there was still a meaningful tradeoff between the 
two and the choice set had not yet been narrowed in such an unattractively constrained manner.    
The trick is thus having the economic acumen and political will to recognize that an adverse 
shock has occurred and to enact prompt adjustment.  This element is even more crucial than 
calculating the right amount of adjustment or choosing among the available instruments to carry it 
out.  51 
 
APPENDIX C. DATA APPENDIX:   DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES OF VARIABLES 
 
“Crisis Prevention” Policy Variables and Related Control Variables 
 
Governance/Structure (noncorrupt).  Source: ICRG, Corruption in Government.  Scale ranges 
from 0 to 6; lower point totals indicate higher risk.  Averaged over period 1990 to 2002. 
 
Openness (opentrade).  Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics. Ratio of (Exports + 
Imports)/GDP. 
 
Capital Controls (qka).  Source: From Klein' s (2003) interpretation of Quinn (1997) data; 
appropriating qka7388r, which is mean of qka73, qka82, qka88 using rmean where qka is Capital 
Account Liberalism for years 1973, 1982, and 1988, respectively; range is 0-5, with higher values 
indicating less restrictive. 
 
Capital Controls (share9295). Source: Klein' s (2003) share9295 variable Proportion of period 
1992--95 that country had open capital accounts or undertook financial liberalization. 
 
Inflation (inflat). Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook.  Annual inflation rates calculated from 
annual CPI data as [(CPIyear-CPIyear-1)/CPIyear-1].  Mean inflation levels determined for each 
country for period 1990 through 2002. 
 
Log of Mean Inflation (loginflat). Source: Natural log of mean inflation levels calculated above. 
 
Short-term Debt/Total Debt (shortotaldebt).  Source: World Bank, World Development 
Indicators (WDI). Average for annual data for period 1990--2001. Short-term debt includes all 
debt having an original maturity of one year or less and interest in arrears on long-term debt. 
 
FDI (net inflows)/GDP (fdigdp). Source: World Bank, WDI. Foreign direct investment, net 
inflows (percent of GDP). 
 
External Debt/GDP (debtgdp). Source: World Bank, WDI. Ratio of total external debt to GDP, 
expressed as decimal.  Averaged over period 1990 to 2002. 
 
Exchange Rate Regime (Flexibility) (exrateflex). Source: IMF, Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions.  Calculated as 1*(% time on regime 1)+2*(% time on 
regime 2)+3*(time on regime 3); 1=hard peg; 2=intermed; 3=float. 
 
Short-term Debt/Reserves (stdebtres). Source: World Bank, WDI;  IMF, World Economic 
Outlook.  Calculated as annual ratio of short-term debt outstanding to stock of reserves at year-
end.  Short-term debt includes all debt having an original maturity of one year or less and interest 
in arrears on long-term debt.  Variable represents mean of ratio for each country during period 
1990 toto 2002, divided by 1000. 
 
Reserves/GDP (resgdp). Source: World Bank, WDI. Ratio of reserves to GDP, expressed as 
decimal.   Averaged over period 1990 to 2002. 
 
Budget Deficit/GDP (bdgdp).  Source: World Bank, WDI.  Overall budget balance is current and 
capital revenue and official grants received, less total expenditure and lending minus repayments. 
Data are shown for central government only.  Mean of annual data for period 1990 to 2002.  52 
 
Expansion of Domestic Credit (ndagrowth). Source: World Bank, WDI.  Calculated using “Net 
domestic credit (current LCU),” which the World Bank defines as “The sum of net credit to the 
nonfinancial public sector, credit to the private sector, and other accounts. Data are in current 
local currency.”  The variable calculated as the mean of the series of values of ln(nda in year m) 
less ln(nda in 1990) for each year m, where 1990<m<=2002. 
 
Standard Deviation of Terms of Trade (sdTOT).￿Source: World Bank, WDI.  Standard 
deviation of annual Net Barter Terms of Trade data for period 1990 to 2002.  Net barter terms of 
trade (1995 = 100).￿Net barter terms of trade is the ratio of the export price index to the 
corresponding import price index measured relative to the base year 1995. 
 
FSU (fsu). Dummy variable registering 1 if country is Former Soviet Republic, 0 otherwise. 
 
Population (pop). Source: University of Pennsylvania, Penn World Tables, in thousands.  Mean 
of annual data for period 1990 to 2002. 
 
War (war). (Intensity Level / pop) * Fraction of Period at War, summed over period 1990 to 
2002.  Source: War data from Gleditsch and others (2002).  
 
Concessional Borrower (conces). Countries eligible for IMF Poverty Reduction and Growth 
Facility (PRFG) as of April 2003.  Dummy variable for 1 if eligible, 0 if not.  Source: 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/prgf.htm. 
 
Tropical (tropical).  Source:  “tropical” variable from Gallup, Sachs, and Messenger (1998). The 
proportion of the country’s land area within the geographical tropics.  Originally sourced from 
ArcWorld Supplement database (ESRI 1996).  
 
GDP PPP-adjusted 1990 (gdp90). Source: World Bank, WDI.  GDP, PPP current international 
US$, averaged over period 1990 to 2002.  This variable represents the natural log of that figure. 
 
GDP Per Capita 1990 (gdpcap90). GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear 
population. Data sourced from World Bank WDI. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all 
resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in 
the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of 
fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. The data are in constant 
1995 U.S. dollars, and this variable is constructed by taking the natural log of that figure. 
 
Investment (invest). Mean of annual values of ratio of Investment (current prices, billions of 
local currency) to GDP (current prices, billions of local currency) for period 1990 to 2002.  
Source: Variable constructed from Penn World Tables data. 
 
Illiteracy (illiter). Source: World Bank, WDI.  Illiteracy rate, adult total (percent of people ages 
15 and above). 
 
Original Sin (osin). Source: IADBtotloan, methodology adopted from Eichengreen, Hausmann, 
and Panizza (2003). This variable is constructed employing Eichengreen, Hausmann, and 
Panizza’s methodology for INDEXA, which is the ratio of securities plus loans in major 
currencies to total securities plus loans issued by the government.  Mean of annual data for period 
1990 to 2002. 
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Secondary Education, Percentage Completed (seced). Source: Data taken from Barro and Lee 
(2000). Average of lsc90, lsc95, and lsc99 which are percentage of "secondary school complete in 
the total population” for years 1990, 1995, and 1999, respectively. 
 
Hard Peg, Variation 1 (hardpeg1). Source: Data from IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions.  Hardpeg generates a value between 0 and 1:  0 if the 
country never had a hard peg (that is, institutionally fixed by means of a currency board, 
dollarization, or monetary union); 1 if it did the entire period; and a fraction of that if it did so for 
only a portion of the period, where the time range extends from 1990 to 2002. 
 
Hard Peg, Variation 2 (hardpeg2).  Source: Data taken from Rose (2001). This variable is a 
dummy registering 1 for a country if it was classified by Rose as belonging to a common 
currency area, and 0 otherwise.  Data extend only to 1996. 
 
Corners, Variation 1 (corners1).  Source: Data from IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions.  Corners generates a value between 0 and 1: 0 if the 
country always had an intermediate regime; 1 if it always had floating or fixed; and a fraction of 
that equal to the fraction of the period it spent on floating and/or fixed, where the time range 
extends from 1990 to 2002. 
 
Corners, Variation 2 (corners2). Source: Data appropriated from Rose  (2001).  This variable is 
a dummy registering a 1 if hardpeg =1, a value between 0 and 1 for the fraction of the period the 
country had floating rates, and 0 if the country had an intermediate regime the entire period.  Data 




(Absence of Capital Controls) x [(GDP per capita (1990)]. opencapital * gdpcap90 
 
(Absence of Capital Controls) x (Noncorruptness). opencapital * noncorrupt 
 
(Absence of Capital Controls) x (Rate of Increase in Domestic Credit). opencapital * 
ndagrowth 
 
(Absence of Capital Controls) x (Budget Deficit / GDP). opencapital * bdgdp 
 





Number of Crises (crises). Number of crises determined where: 
 
For annual determination of crises, a year registers as a crisis if  INDEXmonth is greater than 0.25 
and INDEXmonth-INDEXmonth-12m is greater than 0.10, where INDEX is the month-on-month 
change in the natural log of the exchange rate less the month-on-month change in the natural log 
of reserves.  In the case where a year registers as a crisis year, and the subsequent year(s) do so as 
well, a single crisis is counted as beginning in the initial crisis year and continuing up to three 
years after that.  Therefore, in the case of four consecutive years registering as crises, only the 
first and fourth years will be noted as discrete incidents of crisis, with the first crisis lasting three 
years.  54 
 
For monthly determination of crises, a month registers as a crisis if is greater than 0.45 and 
INDEXmonth-INDEXmonth-12m is greater than 0.10.  Similar to the methodology applied above, in 
the case of consecutive months registering as crises, a single crisis can extend up to 36 months.  
Therefore, in the case of 38 consecutive months registering as crisis, in actuality we will count 
two crisis: the first extending from month one through 36, the second occurring in months 37 and 
38. 
 
In both of the above cases, the period examined extends from January 1990 to December 2002.  
Exchange Rate and Reserves Level data are sourced from the IMF’s International Financial 
Statistics database employing Exchange Rate (line AE.ZF) for the former and Total Reserves 
minus Gold (line 1L.DZF) for the latter. 
 
Mean Growth Real Income (avgrowth). Source: World Bank WDI, calculated for each country 
over period 1990 to 2002 as mean difference of annual values of ln(gdpr), where gdpr is Gross 
Domestic Product, constant prices in billions of local currency. 
 
Standard Deviation of Growth Real Income (sdgrowth). Source: World Bank WDI, calculated 
for each country over period 1990 to 2002 as standard deviation of annual difference of ln(gdpr), 
where gdpr is Gross Domestic Product, constant prices in billions of local currency. 
 
Output Loss in Crises (crisisloss [or compcris]). The sum of output lost during crises, excluding 
from that summation cases where crises were associated with output gain.  Source: GDP, constant 
prices for each country from the World Bank’s World Economic Outlook. 
 
Depth of Crises (depthofcrises).  The average loss to crises, essentially calculated as Output Loss 
to Crises over Number of Crises (crisisloss/crises). 
 
For Monthly Analysis 
 
Length of “Sudden Stop” Interval (lag) is determined as the number of months between a crisis 
month and the preceding reserve peak.  
 
Reserve Peaks (respeak) are determined using 7-month moving average.  Monthly reserves data 
used are from IMF’s International Financial Statistics. 
 
“Crisis Management Policy” Variables 
 
Reserves Loss, percentage (resloss). Determined as the loss in reserves over the lag or length of 
sudden stop interval, as defined above.  Source: Monthly reserves data used are from IMF’s 
International Financial Statistics.  Calculated as the difference of the reserves level at the peak 
and the reserves level at crisis month, expressed as a ratio to the reserves level at peak.  
 
First IMF Program Dummy (Imf6m). A dummy variable registering one if the lag in months 
between the crisis month and preceding institution of an IMF program is equal to or less than six 
months. 
 
Second IMF Program Dummy (Imf12m). A dummy variable registering one if the lag in 
months between the crisis month and preceding institution of an IMF program is equal to or less 
than 12 months. 
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Adjustment Policy Mix. Fiscal contraction vs. expenditure-switching.   (￿ Govt Cons / ￿ TB ), 
over the period (Crisis Yr +1) – (Crisis Yr): Monthly data sourced from IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics. Line 91F used for Government Consumption and Trade Balance is 
constructed as Exports (line 98C) less Imports (line 90C).  Calculated as difference in each 
variable from (Crisis + 1 year) versus (Crisis – 2 years). 
   
Adjustment Policy Mix. Outcome of contraction vs expenditure-switching.  (￿ GDP / ￿ TB), 
Crisis Yr + 1 vs. Crisis Yr: Monthly data sourced from IMF’s International Financial Statistics, 
line 99B used for GDP and Trade Balance is constructed as Exports (line 98C) less Imports (line 
90C).  Calculated as difference in each variable from Crisis + 1 year versus Crisis – 2 years. 
 
CPI sourced from IMF’s International Financial Statistics, “Consumer Prices.” 
 
RER sourced from IMF’s International Financial Statistics, “REER BASED ON REL.CP.”   
 
Real interest rate (r). Determined from monthly money market rates sourced from IMF’s 
International Financial Statistics.  Calculated as the current month’s nominal interest rate, 
divided by 100, less the average of: the difference in the natural log of current CPI less the natural 
log of CPI for one year prior and the difference in the natural log of the CPI one year forward less 
the natural log of the current month’s CPI. 
 
Adjustment Policy Mix: Monetary contraction (level) vs. devaluation  (Rmindelrer). Calculated 
as r minus the difference in the natural log of that month’s RER less the natural log of the RER 
for one year prior. 
 
Adjustment Policy Mix: Monetary contraction (change) vs. devaluation  (delrmindelrer). 
Calculated as the difference in r for that month less r for one year prior minus the difference in 
the natural log of that month’s RER less the natural log of the RER for one year prior. 
 
Change in Maturity Composition.  Data are available from BIS in semi-annual frequency (Q2 
and Q4) and constructed as ratio of short-term bank debt (maturity up to one-year) to bank debt of 
all maturities of consolidated claims of reporting banks on individual countries.  Calculated as 
difference of this ratio; quarter of preceding reserve peak is used in comparison to crisis quarter.  
In cases where reserve peak and crisis fall in same quarter, that quarter is compared against 
following quarter if crisis and/or reserve peak fall in June or December.  If crisis and/or reserve 
peak falls in any other month, that quarter is compared against preceding quarter.  In cases where 
reserve peak or crisis falls in Q1 or Q3, preceding quarter' s data are used.  For data after 2000, 
quarterly data are available.  If crisis or reserve peak falls in first month of quarter, preceding 
quarter' s data are used; otherwise, that quarter' s data are used. 
 
Change in Currency Mismatch. Difference in osin ratio over time.  Currency mismatch variable 
constructed from annual Q4 data.  In cases where crisis occurred in the first six months of the 
calendar year, data were used from the preceding Q4.  In cases where crisis occurred in the latter 
six months of the calendar year, data were used from the following Q4.  56 
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Benin * * *
Bhutan *
Bolivia              *
Botswana * *
Brazil * * *
Bulgaria             *
Burkina Faso         *
Burundi              *
Cambodia             *
Cameroon * *
Central African Rep. *
Chad                 *
China,P.R.: Mainland * * *
Chile * * *
China,P.R.:Hong Kong *
Colombia * * *
Congo, Republic of   *
Costa Rica * *
Côte d'Ivoire * *
Croatia              *
Czech Republic *
Dominican Republic * * *
Ecuador * * *
Egypt * * *
El Salvador          *
Eritrea *
Estonia              *
Ethiopia             *
Gabon                *
Gambia, The * *
Georgia              *
Ghana                * * *
Guatemala * *
Guinea * *
Guinea-Bissau        *
Haiti * *
Honduras * *
Hungary              *




Probit analysis Regression trees prevention & management
Country (panel) (panel) (cross-section)
Indonesia * *
Iran, I.R. of * * *
Jamaica * * *
Jordan * * *
Kazakhstan           *
Kenya * * *
Korea *
Kuwait * *
Kyrgyz Republic      *
Laos * * *
Latvia               *
Lebanon              *
Lesotho              *
Liberia              *
Libya * *
Lithuania            *
Macedonia, FYR *
Madagascar * *
Malawi               *
Malaysia * *
Mali * * *
Mauritania           *
Mauritius *
Mexico * * *
Moldova              *
Mongolia             *
Morocco * *
Mozambique           *
Myanmar * *
Namibia * * *
Nepal *
Nicaragua * * *
Niger                *
Nigeria * *
Oman * *
Pakistan * * *
Panama               * * *
Paraguay             *
Peru * * *
Philippines * *
Poland               *
Romania              *
Russia *
Rwanda               *
Saudi Arabia * * *
Senegal * * *
Sierra Leone * *
Singapore            * 58 
Appendix D. Dataset Country List (cont.) 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
Linear regression
analysis of crisis
Probit analysis Regression trees prevention & management
Country (panel) (panel) (cross-section)
Sri Lanka * *
Sudan *
Syria * * *
Taiwan Prov.of China *
Tajikistan *
Tanzania * *
Thailand             *
Togo * *
Trinidad and Tobago * *
Tunisia * * *
Turkey * * *
Turkmenistan         *
Uganda * * *
Ukraine *
United Arab Emirates * *
Uruguay * *
Venezuela, Rep. Bol. * * *
Vietnam * *
Zambia * *
Zimbabwe * * 59 
APPENDIX E. RESULTS OF PROBIT REGRESSIONS, DIFFERENT THRESHOLDS FOR CRISIS 
 
Table E-1.      Results of Probit Regressions (15%) 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Trade openness  0.003  0.005  0.007  -0.001 
  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.008) 
Financial openness  0.001  -0.002  3.89E-04  -0.004 
  (0.001)  (0.007)  (0.002)  (0.007) 
Constraint on executives  -0.005  0.04  -0.082  -0.01 
  (0.036)  (0.047)  (0.059)  (0.08) 
Stdebt/Reserve  1.986  1.977  2.179  2.475 
  (1.067)  (1.24)  (1.429)  (1.646) 
Debt/GDP  0.001  0.001  0.003  0.005 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.003) 
(FDI+ptf)/Gross liability  -0.003  -0.004  -0.002  -0.003 
  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.005) 
Inflation  1.61E-04  1.57E-04  3.00E-04  3.11E-04 
  1.20E-04  1.24E-04  1.59E-04  1.59E-04 
Fixed ex. rate regime  -0.032  -0.078  0.315  0.248 
  (0.205)  (0.257)  (0.278)  (0.391) 
Intermediate ex. rate regime  -0.087  -0.194  0.065  -0.029 
  (0.194)  (0.229)  (0.246)  (0.309) 
Country dummy  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Year dummy  No  Yes  No  Yes 
No.  observations  456  325  439  293 
Source: Authors’ calculations.         
         
         
Table E-2.      Results of Probit Regressions (15%) 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Trade openness  0.002  0.005  0.004  0.004 
  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.007) 
Financial openness  0.001  0.007  1.12E-03  0.005 
  (0.001)  (0.006)  (0.002)  (0.006) 
Constraint on executives  0.012  0.034  -0.046  0.01 
  (0.029)  (0.041)  (0.05)  (0.075) 
Stdebt/Reserve  0.988  1.3  1.936  2.407 
  (0.678)  (0.842)  (0.935)  (1.215) 
Debt/GDP  1.09E-04  -0.001  0.002  0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
Inflation  1.62E-05  -1.58E-05  -1.66E-07  -3.76E-05 
  (7.91E-05)  (8.12E-05)  (9.57E-05)  (9.58E-05) 
Fixed ex. rate regime  0.069  -0.05  0.315  0.264 
  (0.172)  (0.214)  (0.225)  (0.33) 
Intermediate ex. rate regime  -0.133  -0.217  0.065  -0.004 
  (0.177)  (0.207)  (0.215)  (0.28) 
Country dummy  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Year dummy  No  Yes  No  Yes 
No.  observations  640  401  629  374 
Source: Authors’ calculations.           60 
Table E-3.      Results of Probit Regressions (15%) 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Trade openness  -0.001  -0.001  0.001  0.001 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.005) 
Financial openness  0.001  0.001  2.01E-03  0.003 
  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003) 
Low corruption  -3.77E-04  0.016  0.051  0.058 
  (0.056)  (0.058)  (0.088)  (0.097) 
Stdebt/Reserve  1.176  1.157  1.038  1.014 
  (0.498)  (0.523)  (0.676)  (0.727) 
Debt/GDP  1.57E-04  3.07E-04  -4.15E-04  -0.001 
  (4.68E-04)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
(FDI+ptf)/Gross liability  -0.001  0.001  -0.004  -0.001 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Inflation  1.48E-04  1.58E-04  2.30E-04  2.49E-04 
  (1.13E-04)  (1.15E-04)  (1.52E-04)  (1.55E-04) 
Fixed ex. rate regime  -0.149  -0.171  0.007  -0.143 
  (0.132)  (0.139)  (0.208)  (0.228) 
Intermediate ex. rate regime  -0.253  -0.289  -0.225  -0.358 
  (0.134)  (0.141)  (0.174)  (0.19) 
Country dummy  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Year dummy  No  Yes  No  Yes 
No. observations  810  751  741  673 
Source: Authors’ calculations.         
         
         
Table E-4.      Results of Probit Regressions (15%) 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Trade openness  -0.002  -0.001  -0.001  0.004 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.005) 
Financial openness  0.002  0.002  0.003  0.005 
  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Low corruption  -3.40E-02  -0.01  -0.004  2.28E-04 
  (0.05)  (0.052)  (0.081)  (0.088) 
Stdebt/Reserve  1.031  1.047  1.199  1.116 
  (0.394)  (0.446)  (0.601)  (0.665) 
Debt/GDP  -4.96E-05  -7.84E-05  -7.07E-04  -0.001 
  (4.05E-04)  (4.58E-04)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Inflation  1.35E-05  -6.31E-06  1.92E-06  -1.83E-05 
  (7.46E-05)  (7.73E-05)  (9.55E-04)  (9.62E-04) 
Fixed ex. rate regime  -0.098  -0.154  0.047  -0.133 
  (0.119)  (0.127)  (0.182)  (0.202) 
Intermediate ex. rate regime  -0.27  -0.32  -0.2  -0.36 
  (0.125)  (0.132)  (0.167)  (0.183) 
Country dummy  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Year dummy  No  Yes  No  Yes 
No. observations  959  865  906  817 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table E-5.      Results of Probit Regressions (25%) 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Trade openness  0.002  0.003  -0.001  -0.003 
  (0.003)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.009) 
Financial openness  0.001  -0.009  4.20E-04  -0.029 
  (0.001)  (0.013)  (0.002)  (0.019) 
Constraint on executives  -0.005  0.002  -0.062  -0.005 
  (0.038)  (0.051)  (0.067)  (0.093) 
Stdebt/Reserve  1.476  0.946  1.011  1.913 
  (1.114)  (1.418)  (1.363)  (1.91) 
Debt/GDP  1.87E-04  0.001  0.006  0.008 
  (9.27E-04)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.004) 
(FDI+ptf)/Gross liability  -0.004  -0.005  -0.005  -0.01 
  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.005) 
Inflation  1.94E-04  1.54E-04  3.30E-04  3.01E-04 
  (1.18E-04)  (1.34E-04)  (1.59E-04)  (1.88E-04) 
Fixed ex. rate regime  0.01  -0.016  0.3  0.35 
  (0.215)  (0.283)  (0.292)  (0.421) 
Intermediate ex. rate regime  -0.174  -0.231  -0.081  -0.188 
  (0.206)  (0.249)  (0.267)  (0.344) 
Country dummy  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Year dummy  No  Yes  No  Yes 
No.  observations  456  287  426  269 
Source: Authors’ calculations.         
         
         
Table E-6.      Results of Probit Regressions (25%) 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Trade openness  0.001  0.002  -0.001  -0.004 
  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.008) 
Financial openness  0.002  0.007  0.001  -0.002 
  (0.001)  (0.005)  (0.002)  (0.012) 
Constraint on executives  0.002  0.007  -0.04  0.022 
  (0.032)  (0.045)  (0.051)  (0.084) 
Stdebt/Reserve  1.234  1.352  1.51  2.426 
  (0.704)  (0.937)  (1.029)  (1.33) 
Debt/GDP  -1.48E-04  -0.001  0.003  0.002 
  (9.27E-04)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Inflation  1.50E-04  8.05E-05  1.58E-04  7.22E-05 
  (7.26E-05)  (7.76E-05)  (9.19E-05)  (9.32E-05) 
Fixed ex. rate regime  0.074  0.033  0.236  0.222 
  (0.184)  (0.24)  (0.242)  (0.376) 
Intermediate ex. rate regime  -0.169  -0.274  -0.026  -0.155 
  (0.191)  (0.229)  (0.227)  (0.309) 
Country dummy  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Year dummy  No  Yes  No  Yes 
No.  observations  640  373  572  332 
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
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Table E-7.      Results of Probit Regressions (25%) 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Trade openness  -0.003  -0.003  0.002  0.006 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.005)  (0.006) 
Financial openness  0.001  -3.85E-04  0.001  0.001 
  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003) 
Low corruption  0.016  0.03  0.06  0.056 
  (0.058)  (0.06)  (0.091)  (0.103) 
Stdebt/Reserve  1.061  1.092  0.525  0.539 
  (0.481)  (0.556)  (0.671)  (0.796) 
Debt/GDP  3.90E-05  4.25E-04  -5.49E-04  -2.52E-04 
  (4.92E-04)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
(FDI+ptf)/Gross liability  -0.004  -0.003  -0.01  -0.008 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Inflation  1.53E-04  1.44E-04  2.24E-04  2.06E-04 
  (1.12E-04)  (1.16E-04)  -0.000  (1.57E-04) 
Fixed ex. rate regime  -0.166  -0.196  -0.101  -0.246 
  (0.141)  (0.149)  (0.225)  (0.256) 
Intermediate ex. rate regime  -0.373  -0.363  -0.347  -0.377 
  (0.144)  (0.15)  (0.192)  (0.223) 
Country dummy  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Year dummy  No  Yes  No  Yes 
No.  observations  810  751  688  635 
Source: Authors’ calculations.          
         
         
Table E-8.      Results of Probit Regressions (25%) 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Trade openness  -0.003  -0.003  -0.003  0.004 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.005)  (0.006) 
Financial openness  0.001  6.89E-04  0.002  0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
Low corruption  -0.025  0.004  0.001  -0.014 
  (0.052)  (0.052)  (0.084)  (0.094) 
Stdebt/Reserve  1.051  0.995  0.832  0.817 
  (0.396)  (0.491)  (0.608)  (0.746) 
Debt/GDP  -2.13E-05  1.46E-04  -5.91E-04  -2.75E-04 
  (4.03E-04)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Inflation  1.30E-04  8.56E-05  1.58E-04  1.08E-04 
  (6.43E-05)  (6.53E-05)  (8.51E-05)  (8.23E-05) 
Fixed ex. rate regime  -0.184  -0.243  -0.192  -0.374 
  (0.127)  (0.137)  (0.194)  (0.228) 
Intermediate ex. rate regime  -0.375  -0.383  -0.293  -0.37 
  (0.134)  (0.141)  (0.181)  (0.213) 
Country dummy  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Year dummy  No  Yes  No  Yes 
No.  observations 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
 
959  865  839  758 
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Table E-9.      Results of Probit Regressions (35%) 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Trade openness  0.004  0.009  -0.003  0.002 
  (0.003)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.011) 
Financial openness  -0.001  -0.031  -0.003  -0.084 
  (0.001)  (0.013)  (0.002)  (0.025) 
Constraint on executives  -0.002  0.051  -0.075  0.108 
  (0.041)  (0.051)  (0.074)  (0.094) 
Stdebt/Reserve  1.642  1.748  0.95  3.197 
  (1.17)  (1.576)  (1.517)  (2.314) 
Debt/GDP  -3.24E-04  0.003  0.005  0.017 
  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.005) 
(FDI+ptf)/Gross liability  -0.006  -0.006  -0.007  -0.013 
  (0.003)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.007) 
Inflation  3.23E-04  2.41E-04  5.64E-04  6.30E-04 
  (1.43E-04)  (1.58E-04)  (2.33E-04)  (2.72E-04) 
Fixed ex. rate regime  0.055  -0.066  0.123  0.074 
  (0.236)  (0.313)  (0.303)  (0.464) 
Intermediate ex. rate regime  0.106  -0.118  0.342  0.508 
  (0.217)  (0.258)  (0.273)  (0.388) 
Country dummy  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Year dummy  No  Yes  No  Yes 
No. observations  456  298  401  254 
Source: Authors’ calculations.          
         
         
Table E-10.      Results of Probit Regressions (35%) 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Trade openness  0.003  0.007  1.77E-05  0.003 
  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.009) 
Financial openness  -3.97E-05  -0.002  -0.003  -0.023 
  (0.001)  (0.006)  (0.002)  (0.018) 
Constraint on executives  -0.004  0.051  -0.097  0.101 
  (0.033)  (0.045)  (0.059)  (0.088) 
Stdebt/Reserve  0.974  0.85  0.655  1.599 
  (0.746)  (0.955)  (1.044)  (1.518) 
Debt/GDP  -3.50E-04  -2.24E-04  0.003  0.005 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.003) 
Inflation  1.09E-04  7.24E-06  7.95E-05  -3.56E-05 
  (8.12E-05)  (7.56E-05)  (9.71E-05)  (8.29E-05) 
Fixed ex. rate regime  0.027  0.047  0.101  0.016 
  (0.195)  (0.255)  (0.259)  (0.412) 
Intermediate ex. rate regime  0.006  -0.131  0.294  0.313 
  (0.2)  (0.239)  (0.236)  (0.338) 
Country dummy  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Year dummy  No  Yes  No  Yes 
No. observations  640  365  540  294 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table E-11.      Results of Probit Regressions (35%) 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Trade openness  -0.001  -0.001  3.31E-04  0.005 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.006)  (0.007) 
Financial openness  -0.004  -0.002  -2.00E-03  -0.001 
  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.005) 
Low corruption  -4.70E-02  -0.035  -0.042  -0.035 
  (0.068)  (0.07)  (0.101)  (0.117) 
Stdebt/Reserve  1.471  1.557  1.6  1.744 
  (0.51)  (0.544)  (0.726)  (0.736) 
Debt/GDP  0.001  9.13E-04  7.22E-04  8.19E-04 
  (4.92E-04)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
(FDI+ptf)/Gross liability  -0.005  -0.002  -0.011  -0.006 
  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Inflation  3.09E-04  2.48E-04  4.66E-04  3.58E-04 
  (1.33E-04)  (1.20E-04)  (2.04E-04)  (1.70E-04) 
Fixed ex. rate regime  -0.105  -0.11  -0.096  -0.233 
  (0.156)  (0.165)  (0.245)  (0.268) 
Intermediate ex. rate regime  -0.152  -0.133  -0.019  -0.079 
  (0.153)  (0.165)  (0.204)  (0.243) 
Country dummy  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Year dummy  No  Yes  No  Yes 
No. observations  810  751  665  612 
Source: Authors’ calculations.          
         
         
Table E-12.      Results of Probit Regressions (35%) 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Trade openness  -0.002  -0.001  -0.003  0.006 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.005)  (0.006) 
Financial openness  -0.002  -4.88E-04  -0.001  -4.40E-04 
  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Low corruption  -0.069  -0.041  -0.1  -0.118 
  (0.059)  (0.061)  (0.096)  (0.114) 
Stdebt/Reserve  1.117  1.092  1.639  1.787 
  (0.423)  (0.504)  (0.646)  (0.689) 
Debt/GDP  0.001  3.90E-04  5.77E-04  6.79E-04 
  (5.83E-04)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Inflation  7.95E-05  2.52E-05  6.84E-05  3.17E-06 
  (7.79E-05)  (6.85E-05)  (9.42E-05)  (7.88E-05) 
Fixed ex. rate regime  -0.158  -0.181  -0.172  -0.287 
  (0.139)  (0.15)  (0.209)  (0.24) 
Intermediate ex. rate regime  -0.199  -0.18  -0.04  -0.068 
  (0.142)  (0.155)  (0.188)  (0.229) 
Country dummy  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Year dummy  No  Yes  No  Yes 
No. observations  959  865  797  716 
Source: Authors’ calculations.   65 
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table 1 as having experienced a crisis). At the very least, the prediction that this choice would spell doom 
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advantages of capital controls, in part because they were imposed after the worst of the Asian crisis. 
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